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Postcrisis efforts to extend bankruptcy-resolution techniques to protect the stability of the
financial system have been insufficient, in part because regulators have been conflating bank-
ruptcy’s traditional goals of resolving troubled firms individually with the need to resolve critical
elements of the financial system to ensure its continued operation as a “system.”  This requires
resolving troubled firms collectively, as well as resolving securities-trading markets and the infra-
structure that serves to facilitate that trading.  The Article examines how to design that regula-
tion, differentiating three approaches: reactive regulation, which comprises variations on
traditional bankruptcy; proactive regulation, which consists of preplanned enhancements that
are designed to strengthen or facilitate the resolvability of financial system elements that start to
become troubled; and counteractive regulation, which seeks to reduce the need for resolution (and
thus is not truly resolution).
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INTRODUCTION
Since the global financial crisis of 2008 and 2009 (the “financial crisis”),
regulators and policymakers have been shifting their focus from traditional
microprudential regulation, which protects individual banks and other finan-
cial firms,1 to “macroprudential” regulation that protects the stability of the
1 See, e.g., Behzad Gohari & Karen E. Woody, The New Global Financial Regulatory Order:
Can Macroprudential Regulation Prevent Another Global Financial Disaster?, 40 J. CORP. L. 403,
406–07 (2015).  Microprudential regulation is often simply called prudential regulation.
See, e.g., Dennis Lockhart, President & Chief Exec. Officer, Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta,
Speech at the University of Georgia Law Review Symposium: Thoughts on Prudential Reg-
ulation of Financial Firms (Mar. 20, 2015), https://www.frbatlanta.org/news/speeches/
2015/150320-lockhart.aspx (defining prudential regulation as “regulation focused on the
safety and soundness of individual institutions”).
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financial system itself.2  Because macroprudential regulation is still very
much in the process of developing,3 its specific measures are viewed as
“tools” in a regulatory “toolkit.”4
In designing macroprudential regulation, regulators originally focused
on trying to deter events that might trigger financial destabilization.5  It is
not always clear, however, what those events are or how they could be
deterred.6  For example, the Dodd-Frank Act seeks to dampen overheated
mortgage lending, one of the events that triggered the financial crisis.7  But
mortgage lending is unlikely to be a trigger of the next crisis; each financial
crisis is different from the last and raises new issues.8
Likewise, current regulatory efforts to deter excessive risk-taking by sys-
temically important financial firms (“systemically important firms”)9 are
2 See, e.g., Gohari & Woody, supra note 1, at 403–06; Daniel K. Tarullo, Member, Bd.
of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Speech at the Yale Law School Conference on Chal-
lenges in Global Financial Services: Macroprudential Regulation (Sept. 20, 2013), https://
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/files/tarullo20130920a.pdf; Luis I. Ja´come &
Erlend W. Nier, Macroprudential Policy: Protecting the Whole, INT’L MONETARY FUND (Mar.
2012), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/basics/macropru.htm.
3 Cf. infra note 16 and accompanying text (observing that regulators themselves
admit that current macroprudential regulation may be inadequate).
4 See, e.g., INT’L MONETARY FUND, IMPLEMENTING MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY—SELECTED
LEGAL ISSUES 11 (2013), https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/061713.pdf
(discussing macroprudential “tools” and “toolkit”).  Even financial law scholars refer to the
macroprudential regulatory “toolkit.” See, e.g., Christopher S. Dwight, Note, Missed
(Inter)Connections: Proposed Revisions to the Federal Reserve’s Approach to Financial Stability Analy-
sis Under the Bank Holding Company Act, 18 N.C. BANKING INST. 599, 614 (2014); Gohari &
Woody, supra note 1, at 404–05; Dan Awrey & Katharina Pistor, An Overview of the Legal
Theory of Finance 2 (2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/
global-legal-transformation/files/2016/04/LTF-memo-2014.pdf; cf. Kern Alexander &
Steven L. Schwarcz, The Macroprudential Quandary: Unsystematic Efforts to Reform Financial
Regulation, in RECONCEPTUALISING GLOBAL FINANCE AND ITS REGULATION 127, 130–32 (Ross
P. Buckley et al. eds., 2016) (arguing that the toolkit analogy reflects an ad hoc approach
that does not yet fully protect financial stability).
5 Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Ex Post: How Law Can Address the
Inevitability of Financial Failure, 92 TEX. L. REV. 75, 77 (2013) (“Dodd-Frank’s underpinnings
reflect a strong ex ante financial regulatory bias.”).  Systemic risk is the risk that a financial
system failure will have a significant adverse impact on the real economy.
6 Id. at 93 (observing that we do not yet know all the triggers of systemic risk, nor can
we prevent the known triggers, such as panics, from occurring).
7 See, e.g., Bradley K. Sabel, Mortgage Lending Practice After the Dodd-Frank Act, HARV. L.
SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Nov. 16, 2010), https://corpgov.law.
harvard.edu/2010/11/16/mortgage-lending-practice-after-the-dodd-frank-act/ (discussing
Title XIV of the Dodd-Frank Act, implementing the Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory
Lending Act).
8 See, e.g., Why the Next Financial Crisis Will Be Different, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (Oct.
28, 2014), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/why-the-next-financial-crisis-will-
be-different/.
9 This Article uses the term “systemically important firm” to reference those firms that
have been designated as systemically important by governments.  In the United States, for
example, the Dodd-Frank Act allows the Financial Stability Oversight Council to designate
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questionable.  Although that risk-taking was a trigger of the financial crisis10
and appears to be a continuing threat to financial stability,11 regulators
remain uncertain how to control it.12  Their deterrent efforts focus on politi-
cally appealing factors such as reducing moral hazard and aligning manage-
rial and investor interests.13  But attributing excessive risk-taking to moral
hazard is unsupported by hard evidence and inconsistent with management
incentives;14 and aligning managerial and investor interests ignores that
excessive risk-taking is primarily motivated by a different misalignment—
between managerial and investor interests, on the one hand, and the inter-
ests of the public, on the other.15
Frustrated that they “have made little progress in figuring out how they
might actually” prevent another financial crisis,16 regulators have been
any firm that “could pose a threat to the financial stability of the United States” as a system-
ically important financial institution (SIFI).  Ryan Tracy, What You Need to Know About SIFIs,
WALL ST. J.: THE SHORT ANSWER (Mar. 30, 2016, 1:33 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/briefly/
2016/03/30/what-you-need-to-know-about-sifis-the-short-answer/ (quoting Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, § 113, 12 U.S.C. § 5323 (2012)).  SIFIs
are subject to enhanced supervision by regulators.
10 See, e.g., U.S. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT
xviii–xx (2011) (identifying excessive risk-taking by systemically important firms as a pri-
mary cause of the financial crisis); Jacob J. Lew, Let’s Leave Wall Street’s Risky Practices in the
Past, WASH. POST (Jan. 9, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/jacob-lew-
lets-leave-wall-streets-risky-practices-in-the-past/2015/01/09/cf25b5f6-95d8-11e4-aabd-d0b
93ff613d5_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.3b91d77fefbf (repeatedly attributing the
financial crisis to “excessive risks taken by financial” firms); The Origins of the Financial Cri-
sis: Crash Course, ECONOMIST (Sept. 7, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/schools
brief/21584534-effects-financial-crisis-are-still-being-felt-five-years-article (identifying exces-
sive risk-taking as one of three causes of the financial crisis, the other causes being irre-
sponsible lending and regulators being “asleep at the wheel”).
11 GARY H. STERN & RON J. FELDMAN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE HAZARDS OF BANK
BAILOUTS 23–28 (2004).
12 Cf. Timothy F. Geithner, Are We Safe Yet?: How to Manage Financial Crises, FOREIGN
AFF. (Dec. 12, 2016), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-12-12/
are-we-safe-yet (“Although regulations [imposing specific requirements] have reined in
banks’ risk-taking behavior, they can go only so far.”); Hester Peirce, Clearing, Recovering,
and Resolving, BROOKINGS (Feb. 27, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/research/clearing-
recovering-and-resolving/ (discussing the uncertainty over how law should protect critical
elements of the financial system).
13 See Steven L. Schwarcz, Too Big to Fool: Moral Hazard, Bailouts, and Corporate Responsi-
bility, 102 MINN. L. REV. 761 (2017).  Moral hazard generally refers to the temptation of
persons who are protected from the negative consequences of their risky actions to take
more risks.  In this Article’s specific context, moral hazard is the idea that a systemically
important firm will take risks assuming it will profit from success and, being “too big to
fail,” be bailed out to prevent its failure. Id. at 764.
14 Id. at 765–69.
15 Id. at 769.
16 Binyamin Appelbaum, Policy Makers Skeptical on Preventing Financial Crisis, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 4, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/05/business/economy/policy-makers-
skeptical-on-preventing-financial-crisis.html (reporting the consensus view of an interna-
tional conference of regulators at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston).  Donald Kohn,
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expanding their macroprudential focus to include bankruptcy “resolution”
techniques designed to reorganize the capital structure of,17 or else to liqui-
date with minimal systemic impact, systemically important firms that become
financially troubled.18  To date, however, regulatory efforts to use those tech-
niques to try to protect financial stability have been inadequate,19 in part
because bankruptcy law20 traditionally has microprudential goals—to protect
individual firms that are financially troubled but otherwise viable21—whereas
protecting financial stability is a macroprudential goal.22  Much of the cur-
former Vice Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, observed at that conference that the
Federal Reserve “doesn’t really have the tools” to prevent another crisis. Id.
17 The capital structure of a firm refers to the “mix of debt and equity by which a
corporation finances its operations.” A HANDBOOK OF BUSINESS LAW TERMS 96 (Bryan A.
Garner ed., 1999).  One of the principal goals of a reorganization under chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code is determining what the firm’s new capital structure will be.  Mark J. Roe,
Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model for Corporate Reorganization, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 528
(1983).
18 See, e.g., Peter O. Mu¨lbert, Managing Risk in the Financial System, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 364, 384 (Niamh Moloney et al. eds., 2015) (charac-
terizing “improving the resolvability of financial institutions” or “making them resolvable
in the first place” as a relevant tool “pursuing a macro-prudential objective—even though
partly not ‘prudential’ in nature” and also observing, at that time, that resolution was not a
“main” tool identified with macroprudential policy); Daniel K. Tarullo, Member, Bd. of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Speech at the Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton Uni-
versity: Departing Thoughts (Apr. 4, 2017) (calling the “the need for credible resolution
mechanisms for large banks” an “important topic[ ]”); E-mail from Paul Tucker, Senior
Fellow, Harvard Bus. Sch., to the author (Dec. 2, 2016) (arguing that because “nothing,
other than moving to an economy without debt, can crush the probability [of a systemically
important firm’s failure] to 0%,” a “robust policy [should] include[ ] an effective/credible
regime for resolution”); cf. FIN. STABILITY BD., KEY ATTRIBUTES OF EFFECTIVE RESOLUTION
REGIMES FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS § 3.1 (2014), http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/up
loads/r_141015.pdf (stating that resolution “should be initiated when a firm is no longer
viable or likely to be no longer viable, and has no reasonable prospect of becoming so”).
19 See infra notes 3–7 and accompanying text.
20 References in this Article to bankruptcy law, the term used in the United States,
include insolvency law, which is the term often preferred abroad. See, e.g., Ve˘ra Jourova´,
Speech at the European Commission: Insolvency Law in Europe—Giving People and Busi-
nesses a Second Chance (Apr. 23, 2015), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commission-
ers/2014-2019/jourova/announcements/insolvency-law-europe-giving-people-and-busines
ses-second-chance_en.
21 See supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text.  One reader of this Article asked why
resolution is prudential regulation, as opposed to simply “mopping up the mess.”  This
Article’s claim is that resolution as currently applied to systemically important firms is
microprudential, in that it protects individual firms by trying to reorganize those firms that
are financially troubled but otherwise viable.  So even if resolution “mops up” the mess of
failed ex ante (preventative) prudential regulation, it still represents ex post (reparative)
prudential regulation. Cf. Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 5 (analyzing the difference
between ex ante and ex post financial regulation).  In any event, this Article’s larger argu-
ment focuses on the potential role of resolution in macroprudential regulation.
22 Cf. supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text (describing those regulatory goals).
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rent thinking about using bankruptcy-resolution techniques for
macroprudential purposes conflates these goals.
For example, it is commonly assumed that applying bankruptcy-resolu-
tion techniques to protect individual systemically important firms will protect
all systemically important firms and thereby increase financial stability.23
Regulation based on that assumption, however, can overlook correlations
among systemically important firms24 and can sometimes even reduce finan-
cial stability.25  Many also believe that bankruptcy law itself should be
amended to better adapt it to the resolution of systemically important firms,
but that would still be microprudential, designed to protect individual firms
rather than the financial system.26  Even the Dodd-Frank Act’s Orderly Liqui-
dation Authority, which applies bank receivership to resolving nonbank sys-
temically important firms, is inherently microprudential.27
These flaws illustrate the need to more carefully and critically analyze
the macroprudential goals of resolution in order to differentiate them from
microprudential goals and derive a logically consistent theory of how and
why macroprudential resolution-based regulation (“resolution-based regula-
tion”)28 can help to stabilize the financial system.  This Article begins that
analysis, laying the groundwork in Part I by examining how resolution-based
regulation is being (or contemplated to be) used and explaining why that use
may be insufficient.
Part II then identifies the macroprudential goals of resolution-based reg-
ulation.  It argues that such regulation should be used to protect systemically
important firms not merely individually but also collectively.  It also observes
that the existing resolution-based regulatory focus on troubled systemically
important firms obscures the importance of additionally using resolution-
based regulation to protect other critical elements of the financial system
whose failure could trigger a systemic collapse—the markets in which securi-
ties and other financial assets are traded, and the financial infrastructure that
serves to clear and settle that trading.29
Part III analyzes how to design resolution-based regulation to achieve
those goals,30 using insights gleaned from recognizing that the financial sys-
23 See infra Part I (describing how resolution-based regulation commonly relies on that
assumption).
24 See infra note 158 and accompanying text.
25 See infra Section II.A.
26 See infra notes 45–48 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 49–59 and accompanying text.
28 In accordance with customary bankruptcy usage, see supra notes 17–18 and accom-
panying text, references in this Article to “resolution” include reorganizing the capital
structure or liquidating firms that become financially troubled.  More broadly, however,
this Article uses that term to also include any other ways to restructure or otherwise stabi-
lize a financially troubled firm, market, or other entity—and irrespective of whether that
occurs through a court-supervised process (like ordinary bankruptcy) or an administrative
process (like FDIC receivership). See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
29 See infra Section II.B.
30 The Appendix to this Article summarizes the resulting design recommendations.
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tem is a “system.”  Systems that are both interactively complex and tightly
coupled are prone to catastrophic failure, suggesting that resolution-based
regulation should be designed to reduce tight coupling and/or interactive
complexity.  To this end, Section III.A argues for resolution-based regulation
that would reduce interactive complexity by requiring systemically important
firms to disclose more detailed information about their securities holdings
and contractual obligations.  Section III.B explains how resolution-based reg-
ulation could reduce tight coupling by authorizing central bank last-resort
lending to protect illiquid but solvent systemically important firms31 as well
as to prevent financial market panics.
Finally, Section III.C explains how resolution-based regulation could
protect the financial infrastructure, which is operated by clearinghouses and
central counterparties.  Although private organizations and regulators have
been considering how the equivalent of resolution-based solutions could pro-
tect central counterparties, they have largely neglected the need to protect
clearinghouses that are part of a holding company structure that exposes
them to financial and operating risks of affiliates.  This Section shows how
resolution-based regulation could use ring-fencing to protect against those
risks, including by making the clearinghouse bankruptcy-remote.  It also
explains, by analogy to laws ring-fencing public utilities, why clearinghouses
should be ring-fenced: both provide essential public services, have few if any
substitutes, and are exposed to affiliate risks.
The reader should note that this Article focuses on developing resolu-
tion-based regulation as an additional macroprudential “tool.”32  Except as
specifically discussed,33 the Article does not purport to critique, much less
criticize, non-resolution-based macroprudential regulation.34  Furthermore,
the Article’s analysis of the inadequacy of using bankruptcy-resolution tech-
niques that have microprudential goals to try to protect financial stability, a
macroprudential goal, is not intended to criticize microprudential resolu-
tion-based regulation.  Such regulation has its own merits and can valuably
complement macroprudential regulation.35
31 In the United States, for example, this would require rescission of the Dodd-Frank
Act’s misguided limitation of the Federal Reserve’s emergency lending authority. See infra
notes 115–16 and accompanying text.
32 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.  Thus, the Article argues for supplement-
ing, not replacing, existing uses of resolution-based regulation, even if some such uses may
be currently flawed as a macroprudential tool. See, e.g., supra notes 24–27 and accompany-
ing text.
33 See supra notes 5–15 and accompanying text.
34 For example, macroprudential regulation subjects systemically important firms to
stress tests that may well take into account collective interactions among firms, but that
does not replace the independent resolution-based regulatory goal of protecting systemically
important firms collectively.
35 For example, resolution-based microprudential regulation that more efficiently
transmits losses to creditors of troubled systemically important firms can motivate those
creditors more carefully to monitor their firms’ risk-taking.  Reducing risk-taking by system-
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I. TYPOLOGY OF RESOLUTION-BASED REGULATION
As a real-world foundation, first consider how resolution-based regula-
tion is currently being used, or is contemplated to be used.  This Article iden-
tifies three general approaches.36  The first two approaches—“reactive”
resolution and “proactive” resolution—represent resolution in the strict
sense of reorganizing the capital structure of, or liquidating, a firm.37  The
third approach, “counteractive” resolution, represents regulation that is
designed to reduce the need for resolution by mitigating the risk of failure.
As such, it is not strictly resolution per se.  For that reason, the Article focuses
primarily on reactive and proactive resolution.
A. Reactive Resolution
Reactive resolution-based regulation (“reactive resolution”) is by far the
most common approach in the United States and worldwide.  It is “reactive”
in the sense that it applies if, and only if, a firm becomes financially troubled.
For example, corporate bankruptcy law is designed to reorganize the capital
structure of financially troubled firms to make them viable, and to liquidate
such firms that cannot be made viable.38  As next explained, reactive resolu-
tion is currently being applied both directly and indirectly to systemically
important firms.
1. Applying Reactive Resolution Directly to Systemically Important Firms
In principle, reactive resolution can apply to any troubled firm, even a
troubled systemically important firm.39  Corporate bankruptcy law, for exam-
ple, enables firms to restructure unsustainable debt burdens, such as by
reducing the principal and interest on their debt and extending its maturi-
ties.40  So long as the firm has an inherently good business model,41 the debt
ically important firms is a macroprudential goal. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Misalignment:
Corporate Risk-Taking and Public Duty, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2016).
36 These approaches are, of course, generalizations; there is some potential overlap.
37 See supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text.
38 In the United States, for example, bankruptcy is governed by Title 11 of the U.S.
Code.  The two most common forms of corporate bankruptcy are reorganization, covered
by chapter 11 of Title 11, and liquidation, covered by chapter 7 of Title 11. See DAVID G.
EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY 3–4 (1993).
39 Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 109 (2012) (not limiting debtors under U.S. bankruptcy law to non-
systemically important firms).
40 Stuart Gilson, Coming Through in a Crisis: How Chapter 11 and the Debt Restructuring
Industry Are Helping to Revive the U.S. Economy, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Fall 2012, at 23, 29.
41 Commentators sometimes refer to such a firm as “good company, bad balance
sheet.” See FITCH INV’RS SERV., DEBTOR-IN-POSSESSION LOAN RATING CRITERIA 4 (Mar. 25,
1991) (stating that Fitch favors rating loans to such bankrupt companies).  Reorganization
cannot make a financially troubled firm viable if it lacks a good business model. See id.
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restructuring would give it a “fresh start.”42  The bankruptcies of General
Motors and Chrysler broadly followed this restructuring approach.43
For at least two reasons, though, traditional bankruptcy may be insuffi-
cient to protect financial stability.  First, bankruptcy law focuses on protecting
individual firms, not on protecting the financial system.44  Its focus is there-
fore inherently microprudential.  Secondly, the controversial bankruptcy of
Lehman Brothers has raised concern that existing corporate bankruptcy law
may be ill suited to reorganizing the capital structure of large financial
firms.45  That concern has prompted proposals to amend bankruptcy law to
better adapt it to those types of firms.  To this end, the Hoover Institution has
proposed adding a new chapter 14 to the Bankruptcy Code46 and Congress
has been considering a proposed Financial Institutions Bankruptcy Act.47
These proposed changes to bankruptcy law nonetheless remain
microprudential, following the traditional approach of negotiating an indi-
vidual firm’s debt restructuring.48
Another approach to reactive resolution is epitomized by the Orderly
Liquidation Authority (OLA),49 which contemplates a regulatory supervised
42 Although the term “fresh start” is more commonly used for individuals rather than
corporations, it is helpfully illustrative in this Article’s context.
43 Cf. Ralph Brubaker & Charles Jordan Tabb, Bankruptcy Reorganizations and the Troub-
ling Legacy of Chrysler and GM, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1375, 1375 (arguing that these bank-
ruptcy reorganizations “illustrate . . . that there actually is no clean, clear distinction
between reorganization by ‘plan’ and reorganization by ‘sale’”).
44 Cf. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Speech
at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston 54th Economic Conference: Financial Regulation
and Supervision After the Crisis: The Role of the Federal Reserve (Oct. 23, 2009), https://
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20091023a.htm (observing that “the
bankruptcy code does not always protect the public’s strong interest in avoiding the disor-
derly collapse of a nonbank financial firm that could destabilize the financial system and
damage the economy”).
45 Cf. infra notes 149–54 and accompanying text (discussing the Lehman bankruptcy).
46 See, e.g., Thomas H. Jackson & David A. Skeel, Jr., Dynamic Resolution of Large Finan-
cial Institutions, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 435, 458–59 (2012) (critiquing a proposal made by the
Hoover Institution for adding a new chapter 14 to the Bankruptcy Code); Emily C. Kapur
& John B. Taylor, A New Tool for Avoiding Big-Bank Failures: ‘Chapter 14,’ WALL ST. J. (Mar.
10, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-new-tool-for-avoiding-big-bank-failures-chapter-
14-1457654027 (“The solution is not to break up the banks or turn them into public utili-
ties.  Instead, we should do what Dodd-Frank failed to do: Make big-bank failures feasible
without tanking the economy by writing a process to do so into the bankruptcy code . . . .”).
47 The Financial Institutions Bankruptcy Act of 2017 was introduced in the House of
Representatives in March 2017 under H.R. 1667 to include a new financial institutions
bankruptcy subchapter V to chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.  The Financial Insti-
tutions Bankruptcy Act of 2017, H.R. Res. 1667, 115th Cong. (2017).
48 That negotiation is primarily undertaken by the debtor, its creditors, and its share-
holders in connection with a court-supervised bankruptcy proceeding. See, e.g., Steven L.
Schwarcz, Basics of Business Reorganization in Bankruptcy, in BANKRUPTCY: A SPECIAL COLLEC-
TION FROM THE JOURNAL OF COMMERCIAL BANK LENDING 79, 79–80 (1987).
49 The OLA was created under Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act. See 12 U.S.C.
§§ 5381–5394 (2012).
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proceeding.50  The OLA empowers the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion (FDIC) to put certain large, troubled financial institutions into FDIC
receivership.51  The justification for the OLA is somewhat path dependent:
because FDIC receivership had been used successfully for decades as a
scheme for resolving insolvent banks,52 it should be extended to troubled
nonbanks.53
The OLA has been criticized as being neither transparent nor predict-
able, with the potential to increase moral hazard.  The OLA is an “opaque
process . . . giv[ing] unprecedented discretionary power to the [FDIC] to
render critical judgments without explanation or even a record or forum for
disputes.”54  It is unpredictable because the FDIC can “treat similarly situated
creditors dissimilarly.”55  Like the proposed changes to bankruptcy law, the
OLA is inherently microprudential because it focuses on protecting individ-
ual firms.56  Furthermore, the success of FDIC receivership historically has
depended on larger healthy banks acquiring troubled banks.57  If a large
50 Although beyond this Article’s scope, some fear that the proposals to amend bank-
ruptcy law could undercut the OLA.  Supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text.  For
example, the proposed Financial CHOICE Act would repeal the OLA and substitute for it
a Financial Institutions Bankruptcy Act. See Letter from Jeffrey N. Gordon et al., to the
House Fin. Servs. Comm. et al., (May 23, 2017), https://www.law.columbia.edu/sites/
default/files/microsites/law-economics-studies/scholars_letter_on_ola_-_final_for_con-
gress.pdf [hereinafter “Financial Scholars Letter”].
51 Kwon-Yong Jin, Note, How to Eat an Elephant: Corporate Group Structure of Systemically
Important Financial Institutions, Orderly Liquidation Authority, and Single Point of Entry Resolu-
tion, 124 YALE L.J. 1746, 1754 (2015).  The OLA gives the FDIC “extensive latitude in man-
aging the company.” Id.  For example, it provides the FDIC with “the power to merge [the
firm] with another institution, to transfer the institution’s assets (without any consent or
approval), to suspend legal actions pending against the company, to avoid certain trans-
fers, and to disallow claims that are not proven to its satisfaction.” Id. at 1754–55 (foot-
notes omitted).
52 Banks are exempted from corporate bankruptcy law.  See 11 U.S.C. § 109(b)(2)
(2012).
53 At least part of the impetus for creating the OLA might also have been that FDIC
officials, who were thus familiar and comfortable with FDIC receivership as a means of
resolving insolvent banks, were integrally involved in formulating the federal government’s
regulatory response to the financial crisis.
54 Stephen E. Hessler, A Better Idea for Bankrupt Big Banks, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 24, 2017),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-better-idea-for-bankrupt-big-banks-1493075498.
55 Id. (suggesting the FDIC’s power to treat creditors dissimilarly will cause politically
connected creditors to expect higher recoveries, increasing moral hazard by making them
less cautious when extending credit).
56 The OLA may not be quite as microprudential as traditional bankruptcy, however,
because the FDIC, as an administrative agency, has much more discretion and flexibility
than individual bankruptcy judges to coordinate the resolution of multiple troubled firms
in light of systemic concerns.
57 Historically, the FDIC has had three options when dealing with a troubled bank.
The strongly preferred option is to find a healthier bank to purchase the troubled bank,
through what is called a purchase and assumption transaction. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP.,
MANAGING THE CRISIS: THE FDIC AND RTC EXPERIENCE 1980–1984, at 55–56 (1998).  In the
second option, called open bank assistance, the FDIC lends money to the troubled bank.
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financial firm becomes troubled, there may not always be a larger healthy
financial firm available to acquire the troubled firm.58  As a result, the FDIC
may have to “heavily subsidize the [troubled firm’s acquisition under the
OLA], a point in some tension with the notion that Dodd-Frank has ended
bailouts.”59  This scarcity of eligible acquiring firms would become especially
critical if multiple financial firms become troubled around the same time.
The requirement in the Dodd-Frank Act that certain systemically impor-
tant firms must file so-called living wills represents yet another form of reac-
tive resolution-based regulation.60  A living will is a resolution plan setting
forth how the firm could liquidate with minimal systemic impact if it
becomes financially troubled.61  Although this requirement is intended to
protect financial stability without needing a bailout,62 it might not com-
pletely eliminate that need.  In my many years as a workout and bankruptcy
lawyer, I rarely saw a firm’s failure that accurately reflected, much less closely
resembled, expectations about the firm when it was profitable.  Furthermore,
living wills do not prevent the concurrent failure of multiple otherwise sys-
temically important firms from collectively having a systemic impact.63  The
financial crisis demonstrated that a concurrence of failures is likely when the
causes of the failures are interconnected, such as widespread investor overre-
Open bank assistance has rarely been used, the last time being in 1992. Id.  Its disfavor
might be due to the uncertainty of whether an insolvent bank will be able to repay the
FDIC loan.  The FDIC’s third option is simply to liquidate the troubled bank. Id.
58 Cf.  Stephen J. Lubben, Resolution, Orderly and Otherwise: B of A in OLA, 81 U. CIN. L.
REV. 485, 510 (2012) (questioning “whether the analogy that Dodd-Frank makes between
bank receivership and financial institution failure holds up to careful scrutiny”).  Professor
Lubben notes, for example, that “in times of systemic crisis there might well be no buyers
large enough or confident enough to perform a similar function [i.e., to engage in a
purchase and assumption transaction] with regard to a large financial institution.” Id.
59 Id.
60 Although living wills might appear to be proactive because they are designed at a
time when a systemically important firm’s default is merely a theoretical possibility to take
effect if the firm becomes troubled, they are more properly categorized as reactive because
they only contemplate liquidation and do not provide preplanned enhancements.
61 See, e.g., Jennifer Meyerowitz & Joseph N. Wharton, A Dodd-Frank Living Wills Primer:
What You Need to Know Now, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Aug. 2012, at 34, 34 (“As part of the goal to
remove the risks to the financial system posed by too big to fail institutions, § 165(d) of the
Dodd-Frank Act requires systemically important financial institutions to create living wills
to facilitate rapid and orderly resolution in the event of material financial distress or fail-
ure.” (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Dodd-Frank Act § 165(d), 12 U.S.C.
§ 5365(d) (2012))).
62 Cf. Clay R. Costner, Note, Living Wills: Can a Flexible Approach to Rulemaking Address
Key Concerns Surrounding Dodd-Frank’s Resolution Plans?, 16 N.C. BANKING INST. 133, 138–40
(2012) (summarizing arguments for how living wills might help address the too-big-to-fail
problem).
63 Cf. Victoria McGrane, FDIC Chief Martin Gruenberg: Big Bank Failure Won’t Imperil
System, WALL ST. J. (May 11, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/fdic-chief-martin-
gruenberg-big-bank-failure-wont-imperil-system-1431386899 (observing that some in Con-
gress “doubt regulators could handle the failure of multiple major firms at the same
time”).
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liance on subprime mortgage loans as a source of payment and on the relia-
bility of credit ratings.64
For these reasons, reactive resolution-based regulation that currently
adapts, or has been proposed to adapt, bankruptcy and its variants to systemi-
cally important firms may be insufficient as a macroprudential tool.
2. Applying Reactive Resolution Indirectly to Systemically Important
Firms
Reactive resolution-based regulation that currently applies, albeit indi-
rectly, to systemically important firms is even more problematic.  This is
exemplified by the so-called “derivatives safe harbor” of the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code, which is also widely followed outside the United States.65  This safe
harbor epitomizes how regulatory confusion over cause and effect, in this
case influenced by a powerful industry trade group,66 can actually increase
systemic risk.67
In contrast to rights of other creditors, the safe harbor allows derivatives
counterparties “virtually unlimited enforcement rights against the debtor”68
64 Steven L. Schwarcz, Essay, Protecting Financial Markets: Lessons From the Subprime Mort-
gage Meltdown, 93 MINN. L. REV. 373, 379–83, 404–05 (2008); cf. Janet L. Yellen, Vice Chair,
Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys, Speech at the Annual Meeting of the National Asso-
ciation for Business Economics: Macroprudential Supervision and Monetary Policy in the
Post-Crisis World (Oct. 11, 2010), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yel-
len20101011a.htm (attributing the financial crisis to concurrences of interrelated failures).
65 See Steven L. Schwarcz & Ori Sharon, The Bankruptcy-Law Safe Harbor for Derivatives:
A Path-Dependence Analysis, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1715, 1754 (2014).
66 See id. at 1741–42 (discussing the powerful lobbying influence of the International
Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA)).
67 See supra text accompanying notes 24–25.
68 Steven L. Schwarcz, Derivatives and Collateral: Balancing Remedies and Systemic Risk,
2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 699, 700.  For example, derivatives counterparties “can immediately
collect on their debts at the beginning of a bankruptcy while other creditors cannot,” and
“they need neither return eve-of-bankruptcy preferential payments on old debts nor give
back preferential collateral calls that other creditors must return.”  Mark J. Roe, The Deriva-
tives Market’s Payment Priorities as Financial Crisis Accelerator, 63 STAN. L. REV. 539, 547 (2011).
In 2014, ISDA issued the Resolution Stay Protocol to eliminate these rights for parties that
opt into the Protocol regime. See ISDA 2014 Resolution Stay Protocol, INT’L SWAPS & DERIVA-
TIVES ASS’N (Nov. 12, 2014), https://www.isda.org/protocol/isda-2014-resolution-stay-pro-
tocol/.  Opting in “prevents derivatives counterparties that have adhered to the Protocol
from immediately terminating outstanding derivatives contracts, giving regulators time to
resolve the troubled institution in an orderly way.” Id.  “The effect of these stays therefore
would be to prevent counterparties to a SIFI in resolution from exercising early termina-
tion rights so long as the SIFI continues to pay and perform.”  David Geen et al., A Step
Closer to Ending Too-Big-To-Fail: The ISDA 2014 Resolution Stay Protocol and Contractual Recogni-
tion of Cross-Border Resolution, FUTURES & DERIVATIVES L. REP., Apr. 2015, at 1, 5 (arguing
that these stays are “a cornerstone of a resolution authority’s ability to preserve a failed SIFI
as a going concern”); cf. Irit Mevorach, Beyond the Search for Certainty: Addressing the Cross-
Border Resolution Gap, 10 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 183, 205 (2015) (discussing post-
financial-crisis changes to the World Bank Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor Regimes Stan-
dard in relation to the treatment of derivatives contracts).
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on the supposition that such rights are “necessary to protect against systemic
risk.”69  Ironically, as explained below, those rights can amplify systemic
risk.70
Unlimited enforcement rights permit derivatives counterparties to offset
net claims against the debtor, thereby allowing them “to concentrate their
positions with relatively few [derivatives] dealers.”71  That concentration “can
spread a chain of defaults among financial institutions.”72  The safe harbor
can also amplify systemic risk by undermining market discipline; derivatives
counterparties “know that they often enough will be paid even if their
[debtor] counterparty fails.”73  Professor Mark Roe believes that such lack of
market discipline increased systemic harm from the failures of Bear Stearns
and Lehman Brothers during the financial crisis.74  Furthermore, the safe
harbor applies by its terms to all firms in bankruptcy that are parties to deriv-
atives contracts, not merely to such firms that are systemically important.75
That can inadvertently force the liquidation of an otherwise viable systemi-
cally important firm.76
B. Proactive Resolution
Some resolution-based regulation is “proactive” in the sense that it con-
sists of preplanned enhancements that are designed, at a time when a system-
ically important firm’s default is merely a theoretical possibility, to take effect
if the firm starts to become troubled—by then strengthening the firm’s abil-
ity to pay its debt (and thereby avoid default) or facilitating its resolvability.
Proactive resolution is implicitly justified by chaos theory, “which recognizes
that failures are almost inevitable in complex [engineering] systems.”77
Given the inevitability of failure, the most successful (complex) systems are
“those in which the consequences of failure are limited.”78
Engineering design often limits those consequences through “modu-
larity,” which involves “ ‘partially closing off some parts of the system’ . . .
enabl[ing] repairs to be made before the entire system shuts down.”79  This
“helps to reduce the chance that a failure in one part of [the] system will
systemically trigger [a] failure in another part.”80  I have separately argued
69 Schwarcz, supra note 68, at 700.
70 Id. at 708.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Roe, supra note 68, at 542.
74 See id. at 549–55.
75 Schwarcz, supra note 68, at 712.
76 See id. at 713.
77 Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASH. U. L. REV.
211, 248 (2009).
78 Id.
79 Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Henry E. Smith, Modularity in Contracts: Boilerplate
and Information Flow, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1175, 1180 (2006)).
80 Id.
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that chaos theory should apply equally to the problem of inevitable systemic
shocks in the complex financial system.81  Similar to “modularity,” proactive
resolution involves reparative measures intended to prevent, and therefore to
limit the consequences of, a system failure.
Proactive resolution-based regulation is currently being applied to sys-
temically important firms in at least three ways.
1. Converting Debt to Equity
This type of approach seeks to pre-engineer a change to a systemically
important firm’s capital structure that becomes effective if the firm exper-
iences financial problems.  Regulators have been discussing this approach,
but they do not always acknowledge that it is effectively resolution based.
Different iterations of this approach have been referred to as total loss-
absorbing capacity (TLAC) and contingent convertible securities
(“CoCos”).82  In each case, a systemically important firm would be required
to have a requisite portion of its debt in the form of securities that convert to
equity upon preset conditions.83  Conversion would reduce the firm’s indebt-
edness, thereby (hopefully) making the firm financially viable again.84  The
possibility that their debt claims could be converted into equity should also
motivate creditors to take on more of a “monitoring” role by imposing
stricter covenants,85 which could reduce the firm’s risk-taking.86
81 Id. (focusing on the aspect of chaos theory regarding deterministic chaos in
dynamic systems, which recognizes that the more complex the system, the more likely it is
that failures will occur).
82 Cf. Single Resolution Bd., MREL: Approach Taken in 2016 and Next Steps, at 8–9
(2016), https://srb.europa.eu/sites/srbsite/files/srb_mrel_approach_2016_post_final.pdf
(discussing “the TLAC standard developed under the aegis of the FSB for Global Systemi-
cally Important Banks”).
83 See, e.g., Edward Simpson Prescott, Contingent Capital: The Trigger Problem, 98 ECON.
Q. 33 (2012); Erica Jeffery, TLAC: What You Should Know, EUROMONEY (Mar. 15, 2017),
https://www.euromoney.com/article/b12kl97jn3mk69/tlac-what-you-should-know
(reporting that TLAC contemplates that systemically important firms issue minimum levels
of debt and similar securities “that can be written down or converted into equity in case of
resolution”); see also 80 Fed. Reg. 74,926 (proposed Nov. 30, 2015) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pts. 217, 252); Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys, Federal
Reserve Board Proposes New Rule to Strengthen the Ability of Largest Domestic and For-
eign Banks Operating in the United States to Be Resolved Without Extraordinary Govern-
ment Support or Taxpayer Assistance (Oct. 30, 2015), https://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/pressreleases/bcreg20151030a.htm.
84 See JIANPING ZHOU ET AL., FROM BAIL-OUT TO BAIL-IN: MANDATORY DEBT RESTRUCTUR-
ING OF SYSTEMIC FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND [IMF] (Apr. 24,
2012), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2012/sdn1203.pdf.
85 Emilios Avgouleas & Charles Goodhart, Critical Reflections on Bank Bail-Ins, 1 J. FIN.
REG. 3, 4–5 (2015).
86 This monitoring aspect is counteractive because it is designed to reduce the need
for resolution. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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CoCos have been issued in Europe,87 where the initial tests of their con-
version have had mixed success.  In early June 2017, the junior-bond CoCos
of Spain’s Banco Popular converted as planned to prevent the bank’s fail-
ure.88  Later that month, in contrast, the senior-bond CoCos of Italy’s Veneto
Banca and Banca Popolare di Vicenza were not converted, resulting in a tax-
payer bailout of those banks.89  Although there are ways to try to distinguish
these cases,90 some argue they reflect the inevitable failure of CoCos as a
viable resolution option.91  Additional questions remain regarding the actual
implementation of a CoCo conversion policy, such as what should trigger the
debt to convert92 and how to ensure that creditors holding convertible debt
are compensated without making the debt too costly.93  A recent study even
87 The Financial Stability Board has made this approach a significant part of its plans
to end the perceived too-big-to-fail problem of systemically important firms—the idea that
such firms might engage in excessive risk-taking because they would profit by a success and
be bailed out by the government to prevent a failure. See Fin. Stability Bd., Resilience
Through Resolvability—Moving from Policy Design to Implementation: 5th Report to the G20 on
Progress in Resolution, at 8 (Aug. 18, 2016), http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/Resil
ience-through-resolvability-%E2%80%93-moving-from-policy-design-to-implementation.
pdf.
88 Senior Moment: Is Europe’s Framework for Resolving Banks Broken?, ECONOMIST (June 29,
2017), https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/06/29/is-europes-framework-for-resolv
ing-banks-broken.
89 Id.
90 For example, the new European agency in charge of bank resolution, the Single
Resolution Board (SRB), apparently determined that the Italian banks “did not pose a
threat to financial stability, and handed them to the Italian authorities to deal with under
national insolvency procedures.” Id.  Although there is no evidence of this, the SRB might
also have been more reluctant to convert senior than junior bonds.
91 See, e.g., Neel Kashkari, New Bailouts Prove ‘Too Big to Fail’ Is Alive and Well, WALL ST.
J. (July 9, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/new-bailouts-prove-too-big-to-fail-is-alive-
and-well-1499638636 (arguing that the Italian bank bailouts prove that “‘bail-in debt’
doesn’t prevent bailouts”).  Kashkari contends that CoCos won’t work because govern-
ments “fear financial contagion” if they “force losses on bondholders.” Id.  Where systemic
risk isn’t at issue, he maintains that CoCos won’t work because “governments may worry
that bondholders are politically important constituents.” Id.  Professor Anat Admati like-
wise argues:
It is unrealistic to expect that regulators will trigger recovery and resolution
processes that are complex, costly and untested so that losses can be imposed on
debt-like TLAC securities, and that they would be politically able to follow up with
imposing losses on creditors or mandatory conversion to equity.  This is particu-
larly true if a potential crisis is looming, since pulling triggers and inflicting hair-
cuts might have unpredictable consequences throughout the opaque financial
system.
Anat R. Admati, The Missed Opportunity and Challenge of Capital Regulation, NAT’L. INST.
ECON. REV., Feb. 2016, at R4, R10.
92 See Emilios Avgouleas et al., Living Wills as a Catalyst for Action 4 (Duisenberg Sch. of
Fin., Policy Paper No. 4, 2010.)
93 Eric S. Halperin, CoCo Rising: Can the Emergence of Novel Hybrid Securities Protect From
Future Liquidity Crises?, 8 INT’L L. & MGMT. REV. 15, 21–23 (2011) (explaining why issuing
CoCos to investors may be more expensive than issuing ordinary debt); Paul Melaschenko
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questions whether CoCos “with all the uncertainties surrounding their actual
operation in times of stress . . . are actually a source of fragility.”94
CoCos can also raise their own moral hazard concern—that a “bank that
issues contingent capital faces a moral hazard incentive to increase its assets’
jump risks”—i.e., the risk that bank assets can suffer large, sudden losses.95
In other words, issuers of CoCos may be motivated to invest in risky assets
because such issuers will be protected against a fall in asset value by the
CoCos’ debt-to-equity conversion.  Attempts to reduce this moral hazard,
such as by including restrictive contractual covenants, can be overly rigid and
“impair[ ] the managers’ ability to pursue value-maximizing projects.”96  Yet
the failure to reduce this moral hazard is likely to further increase the cost of
issuing CoCos.97
Even if CoCos did not raise the concerns discussed above, their use is
limited to protecting individual systemically important firms.  That limitation
alone may make them insufficient as a macroprudential regulatory tool.
2. Resolving the Corporate Structure
Effectively, this approach preplans wiping out the equity owners of a sys-
temically important firm that starts to become troubled, making either the
government or the firm’s creditors the new equity owners.  This approach is
similar to a “bail-in.”98
As a macroprudential tool, this approach is increasingly exemplified by
the single point of entry (SPOE) strategy.99  This strategy is artificially depen-
& Noel Reynolds, A Template for Recapitalising Too-Big-to-Fail Banks, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLE-
MENTS Q. REV., June 2013, at 25, 34.
94 Gera Kiewiet et al., Contingent Convertibles: Can the Market Handle Them? 29–30 (De
Nederlandsche Bank, Working Paper No. 572, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3048806 (finding that because investors are unable to distinguish
between the riskiness of different CoCos, they are motivated to sell off their investments in
all bank CoCos after a profit warning issued by just one bank).
95 George Pennacchi, A Structural Model of Contingent Bank Capital 30 (Fed. Res. Bank
of Cleveland, Working Paper No. 10-04, 2011), https://business.illinois.edu/gpennacc/
ConCap030211.pdf.
96 Simone M. Sepe, Corporate Agency Problems and Dequity Contracts, 36 J. CORP. L. 113,
145 (2010).  Another concern over this moral hazard is that it will increase the cost of
CoCos.
97 Cf.  Pennacchi, supra note 95, at 22 (arguing that investors in CoCos that are subject
to “downward jumps in value” will “demand higher new issue yields to compensate for
these potential losses”).
98 Although the terminology is inexact, a “bail-in” usually refers to writing off creditor
claims, as opposed to equity interests. See, e.g., Ben Eisen, A New Worry for Bank Investors:
Bail-In Risk, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 17, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/a-new-worry-for-
bank-investors-bail-in-risk-1455705000; What Is a Bail-In?, ECONOMIST (Apr. 8, 2013), http:/
/www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/04/economist-explains-2.
99 See, e.g., Daniel K. Tarullo, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Remarks at the Federal Reserve Board and Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Confer-
ence: Toward Building a More Effective Resolution Regime: Progress and Challenges (Oct.
18, 2013), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20131018a.htm
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dent on systemically important firms having a parent-subsidiary organiza-
tional structure in which a non-systemically-important parent holds the stock
of the systemically important subsidiary.100  At the start, therefore, the strat-
egy faces implementation challenges for systemically important firms that
lack that organizational structure.101
Under the SPOE strategy, if the subsidiary begins to fail, a government
agency102 would become the receiver of the parent,103 wiping out the parent
company’s shareholders (and potentially writing down some of its debt).104
The receiver then may provide temporary liquidity to the parent to keep the
subsidiary operating (thereby avoiding the instability that rocked the finan-
cial markets after Lehman Brothers collapsed),105 while it seeks to sell its
receivership interest to equity investors to bring in more permanent capi-
tal.106  Proponents of the SPOE strategy are optimistic it can work once the
challenges are resolved.107  Others, however, believe the strategy is unlikely
to be practical.  For example, some scholars characterize it as “a resolution
tool designed for a very stylized, even hypothetical sort of failure.”108  The
President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis observes that there is
no way to test the strategy’s effectiveness until it is actually in use and doubts
it will be useful in a stressed economic climate.109  Others argue that “reputa-
tional contagion” may cause investor flight within the United States once the
holding company is liquidated, regardless of how many subsidiaries are still
(“The aim of the single-point-of-entry approach is to stabilize the failed firm quickly, in
order to mitigate the negative impact on the U.S. financial system, and to do so without
supporting the firm’s equity holders and other capital liabilities holders or exposing U.S.
taxpayers to losses.”).
100 John Crawford, Essay, “Single Point of Entry”: The Promise and Limits of the Latest Cure
for Bailouts, 109 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 103, 107 (2014).
101 This challenge might be especially high for cross-border firms whose organizational
structure is subject to regulation in multiple jurisdictions.
102 In the United States, this agency would be the FDIC pursuant to the OLA. See supra
notes 49–51 and accompanying text.
103 Mechanically, the steps described above might take place through a bridge com-
pany.  The above simplified description nonetheless would still accurately depict the eco-
nomics of the “single point of entry” (SPOE) strategy. See, e.g., Jerome H. Powell, Member,
Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., Remarks at the Institute of International Bankers
2013 Washington Conference: Ending “Too Big to Fail” (Mar. 4, 2013), http://
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/powell20130304a.htm.
104 Id.
105 Jin, supra note 51, at 1764.
106 Powell, supra note 103.
107 Jeremy C. Stein, Regulating Large Financial Institutions, in WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED?:
MACROECONOMIC POLICY AFTER THE CRISIS 135, 136 (George Akerlof et al. eds., 2014).
108 Stephen J. Lubben & Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Too Big and Unable to Fail, 69 FLA. L.
REV. 1205, 1207 (2017).
109 Neel Kashkari, President, Fed. Res. Bank of Minneapolis, Remarks at the Brookings
Institution: Lessons from the Crisis: Ending Too Big to Fail (Feb. 16, 2016), https://
www.minneapolisfed.org/news-and-events/presidents-speeches/lessons-from-the-crisis-
ending-too-big-to-fail.
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operating.110  Even if the SPOE strategy superseded these legal challenges
and were otherwise practical, it operates primarily to protect individual sys-
temically important firms and only secondarily to protect financial stabil-
ity.111  That operation might limit its effectiveness as a macroprudential
regulatory tool.
3. Last-Resort Lending
Illiquidity is the primary factor that can cause firms to fail.112  Most
countries authorize their governmental central bank to act as a lender of last
resort, with power to advance funds to solvent systemically important firms
that are, nonetheless, unable to pay their debts as they come due (i.e., illiq-
uid).113  Such lending is proactive because it is preplanned to strengthen the
firm’s ability to pay its debts if it starts to become troubled.114  In the United
States, however, the Dodd-Frank Act has sharply limited the Federal Reserve’s
authority to make emergency loans to individual financial firms.115  This limi-
tation appears somewhat excessive, if not dangerous.116
In sum, existing and contemplated proactive resolution-based regulation
may also (like reactive resolution-based regulation) be insufficient as a
macroprudential tool.
110 Emilios Avgouleas & Charles A. Goodhart, A Critical Evaluation of Bail-In as a Bank
Recapitalisation Mechanism 1, 18 (Ctr. for Econ. Policy Research, Discussion Paper No.
10065, 2014); cf. Paul H. Kupiec & Peter J. Wallison, Can the “Single Point of Entry” Strategy
Be Used to Recapitalize a Failing Bank? 6–7 (Am. Enter. Inst., Economic Working Paper 2014-
08, 2014) (discussing the possibility that the FDIC may have to borrow from the U.S. Trea-
sury to recapitalize subsidiaries, and expressing concern that Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act
prohibits bank-subsidiary recapitalization using such funds; and also observing that if the
use of the funds are challenged, the losses are likely to fall on taxpayers).
111 See supra note 105 and accompanying text (discussing the possible provision of tem-
porary liquidity to help avoid financial instability).
112 See, e.g., SCOTT BESLEY & EUGENE F. BRIGHAM, PRINCIPLES OF FINANCE 600 (6th ed.
2015) (observing that “the primary reason that firms fail is because they are unable to meet
their working capital needs”).
113 See, e.g., FILIPPO OCCHINO, FED. RES. BANK OF CLEVELAND, Central Bank Lending in a
Liquidity Crisis (2016), https://www.clevelandfed.org/newsroom-and-events/publications
/economic-commentary/2016-economic-commentaries/ec-201602-central-bank-lending-in
-a-liquidity-crisis.aspx.  The U.S. Federal Reserve Bank, for example, has had this role of
lender of last resort to banks.  Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2012).
114 See supra note 77 and accompanying text (defining proactive resolution).  Because
of the borrowing firm’s solvency, last-resort lending might also arguably be categorized as
counteractive.
115 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1101(b), 11 U.S.C.
§507(a)(2) (2012) (limiting the Federal Reserve Bank’s power under section 13(3) of the
Federal Reserve Act).
116 See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon & Christopher Muller, Confronting Financial Crisis: Dodd-
Frank’s Dangers and the Case for a Systemic Emergency Insurance Fund, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 151,
156 n.2 (2011).
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C. Counteractive Resolution
This regulatory approach is “counteractive” in the sense that it is
designed to reduce the need for resolution by preventing firms from becom-
ing financially troubled.  As such, it does not strictly involve resolution.117
For example, regulation imposing capital and liquidity-coverage require-
ments is designed to keep systemically important firms solvent and able to
pay their debts, thereby reducing the need for resolution.118  Capital and
liquidity-coverage requirements, however, are typical forms of ordinary
microprudential regulation.
Nonetheless, counteractive regulation is sometimes discussed as part of
the topic of resolving systemically important firms.119  That broader focus
goes beyond this Article’s focus on regulation that is truly resolution-based
and would unnecessarily expand the Article’s scope.120  This Article there-
fore limits its analysis below to reactive and proactive resolution.121
Part I has shown that the current and contemplated uses of reactive and
proactive resolution may be insufficient as a macroprudential regulatory tool.
The Article next analyzes, more normatively, how and why resolution-based
regulation should be used as a macroprudential tool.  To this end, Part II
identifies what the macroprudential regulatory goals of resolution should be.
Thereafter, Part III examines how resolution-based regulation should be
designed to better achieve those goals.
117 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
118 Cf. Panel Discussion of SIFI at the International Insolvency Institute Annual Meet-
ing in London (June 19, 2017) (discussing capital and liquidity-coverage requirements as a
form of “counteractive” resolution-based regulation).  The author served as a panelist for
this discussion.
119 See id. (discussing not only regulation imposing capital and liquidity-coverage
requirements but also regulating SIFI governance as a way to reduce excessive SIFI risk-
taking).
120 Including counteractive regulation would expand the Article’s scope to include all
forms of regulation that mitigate the risk of failure.
121 For an intuitive way to distinguish this Article’s categories of reactive, proactive, and
counteractive regulation, consider the colloquial reference to a firm going into bankruptcy
as the “sh-t” hitting the fan. See Shit Hits the Fan, URBAN DICTIONARY (Oct. 20, 2006), http:/
/www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=shit%20hits%20the%20fan (defining that as
“the point at which an already unstable situation devolves into utter chaos”).  Reactive
resolution-based regulation would try to clean up the mess once the sh-t hits the fan (anal-
ogous to reorganization) or, if the fan is irreparably damaged, to throw it out (analogous
to liquidation).  Proactive resolution-based regulation would try to prevent the sh-t, once
thrown, from actually hitting the fan.  Counteractive regulation would try to prevent the
sh-t from ever being thrown at the fan.  The analogy is even more robust: if the sh-t hits the
fan and splatters all over, that would cause externalities that are analogous to this Article’s
systemic harm.
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II. IDENTIFYING RESOLUTION’S MACROPRUDENTIAL GOALS
Macroprudential regulation is intended to protect the stability of the
financial system.122  The macroprudential regulatory goals of resolution
should therefore include achieving financial stability.  To that end, resolu-
tion should certainly be used to protect systemically important firms.  The
analysis below first demonstrates, however, that using resolution to protect
each systemically important firm individually is insufficient to protect all such
firms.  Resolution should therefore also be adapted, if feasible, to protect
systemically important firms collectively.  Thereafter, the analysis shows why
resolution should additionally be used, to the extent feasible, to protect the
systemically important markets and infrastructure that, together with firms,
comprise the financial system.
A. Resolution Should Protect Systemically Important Firms both Individually and
Collectively
Intuitively, regulation that protects individual systemically important
firms might appear macroprudential: after all, if no systemically important
firm fails, no such firm’s failure would trigger a systemic collapse.  That
expectation extrapolates the logic of the distributive law of mathematics, that
“the result of first adding several numbers and then multiplying the sum by
some number is the same as first multiplying each separately by the number
and then adding the products.”123  As next explained, however, the distribu-
tive-law analogy between mathematics and systemic risk is false.124  Further-
more, other failures can trigger a systemic collapse.125
The distributive-law analogy is false for several reasons.126  Professor
Rizwaan Mokal observes, for example, that regulatory theory views
“[s]ystemic risk . . . in a bottom-up manner as a simple aggregation of the risk
of individual institutions, with the implication that ‘the whole financial sys-
tem is sound if and only if each institution is sound.’”127  He argues, how-
ever, that protecting individual firms can sometimes aggravate financial
122 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
123 Distributive Law, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNIC, https://www.britannica.com/topic/dis
tributive-law (last visited June 1, 2006).  The distributive law is stated symbolically as a(b + c)
= ab + ac. Id.
124 See infra notes 126–35 and accompanying text.
125 See infra Section II.B.
126 See Douglas J. Elliott et al., The History of Cyclical Macroprudential Policy in the United
States 6 (Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. Fin. and Econ. Discussion Series, Paper
No. 2013-29, 2013), http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2013/201329/
201329pap.pdf (observing that the goal of macroprudential regulation “is to manage fac-
tors that could endanger the financial system as a whole, even if they would not be obvious
as serious threats when viewed in the context of any single institution”).
127 Rizwaan Jameel Mokal, Liquidity, Systemic Risk, and the Bankruptcy Treatment of Finan-
cial Contracts, 10 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 15, 21 (2015) (quoting Claudio Borio,
Rediscovering the Macroeconomic Roots of Financial Stability Policy: Journey, Challenges, and a Way
Forward, 3 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 87, 88 (2011)).
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instability, using the example of “netting” interfirm liabilities to reduce a
firm’s exposure128:
[N]etting is based on the simplistic view that systemic risk is pro tanto
reduced to the same extent as the reduction in risk to each individual finan-
cial institution in the system. . . . [But] netting encourages greater leverage
and inter-party concentrations, weakens lending standards by exacerbating
financial agency and adverse selection costs, redistributes counterparty risk
rather than reducing it, exacerbates market volatility in times of stress, and
thus creates an additional channel for risk transmission, propagating the
effects of shock through the financial system.129
The distributive-law analogy is also false because individual systemically
important firms are not always resolved in a way that reduces systemic risk.
Corporate reorganization law, for example, normally looks to the parties in
interest to reach a consensual debt restructuring plan,130 absent which the
firm could attempt to cram down a plan over those parties’ objections or, in a
worst case, be liquidated.131  The parties in interest are limited primarily,
however, to the firm and its investors (i.e., its creditors and shareholders).132
As shown in a separate context, the interests of those parties are fundamen-
tally misaligned with the public’s interest to reduce systemic risk.133
Finally, the distributive-law analogy does not address correlated triggers
that cause the concurrent failure of multiple systemically important firms.
Regulation intended to protect individual firms may then be overwhelmed.
Ironically, regulation designed to protect individual firms can even create
correlated triggers.  For example, regulators generally require insurance
companies to divest corporate bonds that are downgraded below an invest-
ment-grade rating in order to protect individual insurers against a loss in the
value of assets available to pay claims.134  That requirement, however, has the
128 Professor Mokal further argues that regulatory theory focuses too heavily on “pro-
cyclical measures of risk” that are inappropriate for systemic stability. Id. at 21.  For exam-
ple, “[c]redit ratings . . . have long been recognized as failing timeously to predict crises,
and bank capital and loan loss provisioning regulations premised on [a procyclical focus]
have proven potent amplifiers that exacerbate financial sector stress.” Id. at 21–22.
129 Id. at 19.  In the derivatives context, I have made similar arguments about the
potential for netting to increase interparty concentrations, weaken credit standards, and
otherwise increase systemic risk. See supra notes 68–73 and accompanying text.
130 See 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b) (2012) (listing the parties in interest).
131 Compare id. § 1129(b) (discussing the cram-down requirements that a plan be fair
and equitable and not discriminate unfairly), with id. § 1112 (discussing the ability of bank-
ruptcy courts to convert a reorganization case to a liquidation for cause, including inability
to confirm a plan of reorganization).
132 See id. § 1109(b).
133 Schwarcz, supra note 35, at 2; see also supra note 15 and accompanying text (refer-
encing that misalignment).
134 See Daniel Schwarcz & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk in Insurance, 81 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1569, 1596, 1602 (2014).
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potential to correlate an industry-wide dumping of bonds that lose that rat-
ing, in turn causing a systemically risky bond-market collapse.135
To overcome these limitations, resolution-based regulation should be
designed to try to protect systemically important firms not merely individually
but also collectively.
B. Resolution Should Also Protect Systemically Important
Markets and Infrastructure
Even if systemically important firms could be protected both individually
and collectively, the failure of other critical elements of the financial system
could trigger a systemic collapse.136  Resolution-based regulation should also
have the goal of protecting those other elements against failure.
One such critical element is the financial markets that facilitate the
transfer (i.e., the issuance and trading) of securities.137  Arguably, for exam-
ple, the financial crisis was more fundamentally caused by a collapse in the
market for mortgage-backed securities than by the failure of systemically
important firms, such as Lehman Brothers, that were caused by the market
collapse.138  In 2007, when home prices began declining, subprime borrow-
ers could not refinance and, in many cases, defaulted.139  Even borrowers
who could afford to pay their mortgage loans were “tempted to walk away as
mortgage loans exceeded home values.”140  These mortgage defaults in turn
caused substantial amounts of low investment-grade mortgage-backed securi-
ties (MBS) to default and some AAA-rated MBS to be downgraded.141  The
defaults were especially large for certain highly leveraged MBS securities,
which were indirectly backed by subprime mortgages;142 full payment of even
the senior classes of these securities was extremely sensitive to cash-flow varia-
135 Id. at 1602; see Erik F. Gerding, Law, Bubbles, and Financial Regulation, in 18 THE
ECONOMICS OF LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS 1, 13 (Nicholas Mercuro & Michael D. Kaplowitz eds.,
2014) (arguing that regulations can create investment preferences for certain asset classes,
setting the stage for asset bubbles and disastrous bank runs); Mu¨elbert, supra note 18, at
395 (observing that financial regulation that “causes banks to act in a (more) uniform way
. . . will increase systemic risk”).
136 Cf. Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 5, at 102 (discussing the “elements and inter-
connections” of the financial system that permit it to function as a “system”).  For some-
thing to qualify as a system, (1) it must be composed of elements, (2) its elements must be
interconnected, and (3) it must have a function that is distinct from its elements. DONELLA
H. MEADOWS, THINKING IN SYSTEMS 11 (Diana Wright ed., 2008).  The financial system
therefore clearly qualifies as a “system.”
137 Cf. Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 202 (2008) (discussing the
systemic importance of financial markets and observing that the extraordinary growth of
disintermediation is making markets increasingly important to the financial system).
138 This financial crisis discussion is adapted from Steven L. Schwarcz, Keynote Address,
Understanding the Subprime Financial Crisis, 60 S.C. L. REV. 549 (2009).
139 Id. at 551.
140 Id. at 552.
141 Id.
142 Id.  These were called “ABS CDO” securities. Id.
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tions and dependent on the (failed) assumption that housing prices would
continue to appreciate.143  These defaults and downgrades of rated securi-
ties, in turn, unnerved investors who believed that AAA meant ironclad safety
and that investment grade meant relative freedom from default.144
“Investors started losing confidence in ratings and avoiding debt securi-
ties.”145  Reduced demand caused the price of debt securities to fall, requir-
ing firms using those securities as collateral to mark them to market and put
up cash; and generating cash required the sale of more securities, causing
market prices to plummet further downward in a death spiral.146  The mar-
ket prices of MBS, for example, “collapsed substantially below the intrinsic
value of the mortgage assets underlying those securities.”147  This collapse in
market prices required banks and other financial institutions holding MBS
(and other asset-backed securities) “to write down the securities’ value.”148
That in turn made institutions with significant holdings of these securities,
such as Lehman Brothers, appear (if not be) financially riskier, raising con-
cern over counterparty risk.149  “[A]fraid these institutions might default on
their contractual obligations, many parties stopped dealing with them.”150
The refusal of the U.S. government to save Lehman Brothers in mid-Septem-
ber 2008, and its resulting bankruptcy, added to the panic.151  Debt markets
became so spooked that even the short-term commercial paper markets virtu-
ally shut down.152  Without debt-market financing, which constitutes approxi-
mately fifty-eight percent of all corporate credit availability,153 companies
lacked money to expand and sometimes even to pay current expenses.154
The economy collapsed.
143 Id. at 550.
144 Id. at 552.
145 Id.
146 Id.  “The high leverage of many firms appears to have made this death spiral worse.
Encouraged by the earlier liquidity glut, many firms had borrowed excessively because the
cost of funds was so cheap.” Id. (footnote omitted).
147 Id. at 552–53.
148 Id. at 553.
149 “Counterparty risk” refers to the risk that a party may default on its contractual
obligation to another party.  Colleen Baker, The Federal Reserve as Last Resort, 46 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 69, 74 (2012).
150 Schwarcz, supra note 138, at 553.
151 Id. at 552.
152 Id.
153 SILVIO CONTESSI ET AL., FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS, BANK VS. BOND FINANCING OVER
THE BUSINESS CYCLE 1 (2013), https://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/es/13/
ES_31_2013-11-15.pdf.  By comparison, bank loans make up only about ten percent of cor-
porate credit availability. Id. These estimates are based on 2003–2013 data. Id.
154 See, e.g., Fiorella De Fiore & Harald Uhlig, Corporate Debt Structure and the Finan-
cial Crisis 2 (2012) (unpublished manuscript), https://economicdynamics.org/meet-
papers/2012/paper_429.pdf (“[T]he implication of the turmoil for economic activity
[during the financial crisis] was a drop in investment and output that was
unprecedented . . . .”).
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Another critical element of the financial system whose failure could trig-
ger a systemic collapse is its infrastructure,155 which (among other functions)
provides the clearing156 and settlement157 services needed to consummate
the transfer of securities and other financial assets and the payment there-
for.158  The clearinghouses and other firms currently providing the bulk of
these services are sometimes called financial market utilities (“FMUs”).159
For example, The Depository Trust Company (DTC) is an FMU that clears
and settles the transfer of securities160 and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange
is an FMU that clears and settles transactions involving “exchange-traded
contracts” and over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives.161  Some FMUs, known as
155 BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS & INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, PRINCIPLES FOR FINAN-
CIAL MARKET INFRASTRUCTURES 14 (2012) (observing that “the disorderly failure of [a finan-
cial market infrastructure] would likely lead to systemic disruptions”); cf. Darrell Duffie,
Resolution of Failing Central Counterparties, in MAKING FAILURE FEASIBLE 87, 88 (Kenneth E.
Scott et al. eds., 2015) (discussing the consequences of “loss of continuity of critical clear-
ing services on which the financial system has come to depend”).
156 Clearing is “the process of transmitting, reconciling and, in some cases, confirming
transfer orders prior to settlement.” EUROPEAN CENT. BANK, GLOSSARY OF TERMS RELATED
TO PAYMENT, CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS 5 (2009), https://www.ecb.europa.eu/
pub/pdf/other/glossaryrelatedtopaymentclearingandsettlementsystemsen.pdf.
157 Settlement is “the completion of a transaction or of processing with the aim of dis-
charging participants’ obligations through the transfer of funds and/or securities.” Id.
158 For a broader discussion of the financial infrastructure, see Designated Financial Mar-
ket Utilities, BD. GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYS., https://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsys-
tems/designated_fmu_about.htm (last updated Jan. 29, 2015).
159 Cf. id. (referring to financial market utilities (FMU) as “multilateral systems that
provide the infrastructure for transferring, clearing, and settling payments, securities, and
other financial transactions among financial institutions or between financial institutions
and the system”).  A simple example of an FMU’s function is to provide the basic mecha-
nism by which financial assets are conveyed from seller to buyer and reciprocal compensa-
tion is conveyed from buyer to seller.  Richard Heckinger et al., Financial Market Utilities
and the Challenge of Just-in-Time Liquidity (Fed. Res. Bank of Chicago, Chicago Fed. Letter
No. 268a, 2009), https://www.chicagofed.org/publications/chicago-fed-letter/2009/
november-268a.  The Financial Stability Oversight Council has the power to designate an
FMU as systemically important “if the failure of or a disruption to the functioning of the
FMU could create or increase the risk of significant liquidity or credit problems spreading
among financial institutions or markets and thereby threaten the stability of the U.S. finan-
cial system.” FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT 110 (2012), https:/
/www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/Documents/2012%20Annual%20Report.pdf.  At least
eight of the largest FMUs, known as Systemically Important FMUs (“SIFMUs”), have been
so designated.  Dan Ryan, Financial Market Utilities: Is the System Safer?, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON
CORP. GOV. & FIN. REG. (Feb. 21, 2015), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/02/21/
financial-market-utilities-is-the-system-safer/.
160 Steven L. Schwarcz, Intermediary Risk in a Global Economy, 50 DUKE L.J. 1541, 1550
(2001).
161 See CHI. MERCANTILE EXCH. GRP., CME GROUP OVERVIEW (2013), http://www.cme
group.com/company/visit/files/cme-group-overview.pdf (describing the Exchange’s activ-
ities); Designated Financial Market Utilities, supra note 158 (confirming that the Exchange is
an FMU).
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central counterparties (“CCPs”),162 also help to reduce counterparty risk that
can result from those procedural steps.163
To understand how an FMU’s failure could trigger a systemic collapse,
consider the failures, first, of an FMU that clears and settles securities transac-
tions, and thereafter, of an FMU acting as a CCP to help reduce counterparty
risk that can result from the settlement of derivatives transactions.164
Although the clearing and settlement services performed by the first FMU
are unlikely to cause it to fail,165 some FMUs are part of a holding company
structure that exposes them to other risks.166  If, say, an FMU’s corporate
parent files for bankruptcy, the FMU could easily become part of the bank-
ruptcy estate.167  Any resulting suspension of clearing and settlement, even if
temporary, could disrupt the transfer of securities and cause a financial
panic.168
The systemic risks are even greater for an FMU acting as a CCP to help
reduce counterparty risk.  Such a CCP reduces counterparty risk by assuming
the potential obligation of each counterparty to pay the other counterparty
on the settlement date.169  Thus, if the settlement requires counterparty A to
pay counterparty B, the CCP will make that payment to counterparty B and
then seek reimbursement from counterparty A.170  Although this reduces
individual counterparty risk, it concentrates aggregate counterparty risk in
the CCP.171  If the CCP is unable to obtain sufficient aggregate reimburse-
162 See Baker, supra note 149, at 74.
163 This counterparty risk being the risk that a party involved in the transfer, clearance,
or settlement defaults on its contractual obligation to another such party. See id.
164 In the United States, all standardized derivatives transactions must be settled
through such central counterparties (“CCPs”).  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Con-
sumer Protection Act § 725(c), 7 U.S.C. § 7a-1 (2012).
165 This assumes the FMU provides those services without negligence.
166 See infra notes 264–75 and accompanying text.
167 This could occur in various ways in the United States, including the parent causing
its FMU subsidiary to file for bankruptcy, 11 U.S.C. § 301 (2012), or the FMU being sub-
stantively consolidated with the parent. Id. § 105.
168 Cf. Hester Peirce, Derivatives Clearinghouses: Clearing the Way to Failure, 64 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 589, 627 (2016) (observing that in the case of a CCP failure, “there might not be a
substitute CCP, so the market for any OTC derivatives cleared at the failing CCP and sub-
ject to the clearing mandate would lock up”).  The question of whether the FMU’s bank-
ruptcy would suspend clearing or settlement would be an issue of first impression.  11
U.S.C. § 362(a) (imposing a stay automatically suspending various interactions between a
debtor and third parties).
169 Heckinger et al., supra note 159 (observing that CCPs legally interpose themselves
between counterparties, becoming “the legal buyer to every seller and the legal seller to
every buyer”); see, e.g., FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, supra note 159, at 174 (discuss-
ing ICE Clear Credit, a CCP that clears credit-default swap (CDS) derivatives, thereby
“lower[ing] the likelihood of a default leading to a financial contagion of defaults across
major CDS counterparties”).
170 Cf. Mark J. Roe, Clearinghouse Overconfidence, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1641, 1661 (2013)
(providing an example of the above scenario, where a CCP pays counterparty B).
171 See Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk: Towards an Analyti-
cal Framework, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349, 1394–95 (2011).
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ment, it may itself default.172  That in turn could suspend all or a portion of
the market for derivatives transactions, causing systemic contagion including
“fire sales of collateral or derivatives contracts, exacerbating broad market
volatility.”173
For these reasons, the macroprudential goals of resolution-based regula-
tion should include protecting not only systemically important firms (both
individually and collectively) but also the systemically important markets and
infrastructure that, together with such firms, comprise the financial system.
Next consider how resolution-based regulation could be designed to achieve
those goals.
III. DESIGNING RESOLUTION-BASED REGULATION
TO ACHIEVE THOSE GOALS
This Part begins by examining how resolution-based regulation could
protect systemically important firms collectively,174 considering both reactive
and proactive resolution.175 Thereafter, it examines how resolution-based
regulation could protect systemically important markets and infrastruc-
ture,176 again considering both reactive and proactive resolution.  The
Appendix to this Article briefly summarizes the resulting design recommen-
dations, referencing them back to this Part’s detailed discussion.
A. Resolution-Based Regulation of Systemically Important Firms
As discussed, resolution-based regulation of systemically important firms
should have the macroprudential goal of protecting such firms not only indi-
vidually but also collectively.  Consider how that could be done.
1. Reactive Resolution
Reactive resolution-based regulation is inherently limited in its ability to
protect systemically important firms collectively; by the time multiple firms
become troubled, it may be too late to effectively reorganize their capital
structure to make them viable.  Even the recent proposals to amend bank-
ruptcy law to better adapt it to systemically important firms are limited in this
172 Id.  I am not claiming that default is inevitable.  CCPs typically “rely on a variety of
risk-management strategies, including margin requirements and the maintenance of a loss-
sharing pool funded by members to cover losses arising from any clearing member
defaults.”  Id.; see also Ryan, supra note 159 (observing that some of these risk-management
strategies are required by law).
173 Duffie, supra note 155, at 88 (arguing that a CCP’s “fail[ure] to meet its obligations
to other systemically [important] clearing members” could cause that contagion).
174 See infra Section III.A.
175 Part III does not focus on counteractive regulation because, as discussed, that
broader focus would be conceptually inconsistent with resolution-based regulation and
also would unnecessarily expand the Article’s scope. See supra note 120 and accompanying
text.
176 See infra Sections III.B–C.
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way.177  The author is part of a group of bankruptcy and financial regulation
scholars that has been considering this problem, among others.178
There are at least two constraints.  First, even if some of these systemi-
cally important firms could be reorganized, the “economy will need a coordi-
nated response, particularly if the entire financial system suffers a panic or
lack of liquidity.”179  In the United States, “[b]ankruptcy judges cannot pro-
vide that coordinated response.”180  Regulatory-supervised resolution, how-
ever, could provide a more coordinated response—especially
internationally.181  Regulatory reassurance might also help to reduce the risk
of a financial panic.182
This Article has already discussed regulatory-supervised reactive resolu-
tion by the FDIC, pursuant to its receivership powers under the OLA.183  As
an administrative agency, the FDIC certainly has more discretion and flexibil-
ity than individual bankruptcy judges to coordinate the resolution of multi-
ple troubled firms.184  However, the OLA’s own limitations, such as its
overdependence on healthy large firms to acquire troubled firms and its lack
of transparency and predictability,185 may well impair the FDIC’s ability to
provide a fully coordinated response or even to provide regulatory reassur-
ance.  A regulatory-supervised resolution procedure that more closely paral-
lels judge-supervised bankruptcy might help to supersede those limitations
while providing a coordinated response.  Although such a procedure might
raise its own limitation—that supervising regulatory officials will likely have
177 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
178 Cf. Financial Scholars Letter, supra note 50, at 4 (discussing the possibility of “multi-
ple institutions failing or tottering simultaneously”).  The main purpose of this letter was to
oppose proposed legislation that would replace the FDIC’s Orderly Liquidation Authority
with a new bankruptcy procedure for resolving systemically important firms. Id. at 2; cf.
supra note 62 and accompanying text (observing that living wills do not prevent the con-
current failure of multiple firms, and that protection designed for individual firms may be
overwhelmed by, and thus inadequate to protect against, the concurrent failure of multiple
firms).
179 Financial Scholars Letter, supra note 50, at 4.
180 Id. at 4–5 (arguing that bankruptcy judges “cannot caucus and decide how to han-
dle multiple bankruptcies in a way that best stabilizes the economy” because they “have
neither a mandate, nor the proper experience, nor the staff needed to design a plan to
protect the financial system as a whole”).
181 Id. at 5.
182 Id.; cf. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC
CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 436–37 (2011) (arguing that investor fear leading to the
financial crisis was compounded by the failure of regulatory agencies to quickly address the
problem or reassure investors that the problem was isolated).
183 See supra notes 49–59 and accompanying text (discussing those receivership
powers).
184 Cf. supra note 56 (observing that the FDIC, as an administrative agency, has much
more discretion and flexibility than individual bankruptcy judges to coordinate the resolu-
tion of multiple troubled firms in light of systemic concerns).
185 See supra notes 55–57 and accompanying text.
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much less resolution expertise than bankruptcy judges—that limitation could
be addressed in various ways, including by assigning bankruptcy judges, as
needed, to be supervisors of the regulatory procedures.
The other constraint is the difficulty of raising sufficient financing—typi-
cally referred to as “debtor in possession” (DIP) financing—to enable multi-
ple troubled systemically important firms to continue operating for the
length of time needed to reorganize their capital structure.186  Absent DIP
financing, a firm may have little choice but to liquidate.187  The “private
sources” that ordinarily provide DIP financing in traditional bankruptcy cases
“would be either unavailable or at least inadequate” to resolve large systemi-
cally important firms.188  That lack of private DIP financing would be exacer-
bated, of course, if a multitude of such firms need financing at the same
time.
If private sources are inadequate, the government itself might consider
providing the DIP financing.  The U.S. and Canadian governments provided
DIP financing, for example, in the General Motors bankruptcy.189  As the
receiver of troubled deposit-taking banks, the FDIC also has authority to take
“action or provide assistance . . . [that] is necessary to avoid or mitigate ‘seri-
ous adverse effects on economic conditions or financial stability,’” which
arguably includes providing DIP financing if sufficient private financing is
unavailable.190  The ability and willingness of governments to extend DIP
financing more broadly are beyond this Article’s scope.191
2. Proactive Resolution
This Article has shown that existing and contemplated proactive resolu-
tion-based regulation may also be insufficient as a macroprudential tool.192
186 Gilson, supra note 40, at 28.
187 Id. at 23–28 (explaining that DIP financing provides a solution to the problem of
“debt overhang,” which can leave a firm with “no choice but to liquidate their assets”).
188 Howell E. Jackson & Stephanie Massman, The Resolution of Distressed Financial Con-
glomerates, 3 RUSSELL SAGE FOUND. J. SOC. SCI. 48, 60–61, (2017), https://www.rsfjournal.
org/doi/pdf/10.7758/RSF.2017.3.1.03.
189 Christine Caulfield, GM Gets OK to Tap $33.3B In DIP Financing, LAW 360 (June 25,
2009), https://www.law360.com/articles/108332/gm-gets-ok-to-tap-33-3b-in-dip-financing.
190 Jackson & Massman, supra note 188, at 67 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G)
(2012)).
191 In the United States, the Federal Reserve might also have authority to “engage in
lender-of-last resort functions for appropriately collateralized credit under a ‘program or
facility with broad-based eligibility.’” Id. at 67 (quoting Federal Reserve Act § 13(3), 12
U.S.C. § 343 (2012)).
192 Requiring systemically important firms to have a requisite portion of their debt in
the form of securities that convert to equity if the firm experiences financial problems
(such as TLAC and CoCos) may be insufficient because the initial tests of such conversion
have had mixed success and, more importantly, the use of conversion is limited to protect-
ing individual firms. See supra subsection I.B.1.  Trying to control the failure of systemically
important firms by having a government agency become the receiver of the parent, wiping
out the parent company’s shareholders (and potentially writing down some debt) (such as
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To try to design more effective proactive resolution-based regulation, con-
sider insights into protecting financial stability from viewing the financial sys-
tem as a “system.”193
Systems in general—and the financial system in particular—that are
both interactively complex194 and tightly coupled195 are “prone to cata-
strophic failures” because that combination “obfuscate[s] risk and present[s]
little opportunity for intervention following a local shock.”196  In contrast,
systems that are not both interactively complex and tightly coupled are less
systemically risky.197  This suggests that proactive resolution-based regulation
should be designed to reduce tight coupling and/or interactive complexity
among systemically important firms.
Consider how proactive resolution-based regulation could be designed
to reduce interactive complexity.198  Systemically important firms cause at
least two sources of interactive complexity in the financial system, both result-
ing from information failures.  The first source of interactive complexity is
that market participants do not know what securities other firms hold.199  As
a form of risk aversion, they therefore assume that distressed securities
owned by a given firm are also held by similarly situated firms.200  If any of
the SPOE strategy), may be insufficient because it is artificially dependent on systemically
important firms having a parent-subsidiary organizational structure; even then it may be
ineffective in a stressed economic climate, and it operates primarily to protect individual
systemically important firms and only secondarily to protect financial stability. See supra
subsection I.B.2.  And central bank last-resort lending may be insufficient because, at least
in the United States, the Dodd-Frank Act has sharply limited the Federal Reserve’s author-
ity to make these types of loans. See supra subsection I.B.3.
193 Cf. supra note 136 (showing that the financial system “clearly qualifies as a
‘system’”).
194 “An interactively complex system is one whose components can interact in unex-
pected or varied ways . . . .” RICHARD BOOKSTABER, A DEMON OF OUR OWN DESIGN: MARKET,
HEDGE FUNDS, AND THE PERILS OF FINANCIAL INNOVATION 154 (2007).  As a result, a shock to
one component can lead to “failures that seem to come out of nowhere or that appear
unfathomably improbable.” Id. at 55.
195 A “tightly coupled system is one that is highly interdependent, so that a disturbance
to one part of the system can spread almost instantaneously to other parts of the system.”
Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 5, at 94.
196 Id. at 112.
197 Id.  For example:
[A system that is interactively complex but only loosely coupled . . . is likely to
produce unpredictable interactions among its elements because of the system’s
interactive complexity.  However, the ultimate damage to such a system from a
failure at the level of its elements is likely to be manageable because loose coup-
ling presents opportunities for early intervention.
Id. (footnote omitted).
198 Regulation probably cannot eliminate interactive complexity because information
failures, which underlie the complexity, are inherent in human arrangements.  Complexity
itself can also sometimes be beneficial; for example, derivatives can be used to better allo-
cate risk among market participants.
199 Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 5, at 94.
200 Id. at 95.
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those firms fails, market participants may become reluctant to extend credit
to similar firms—even those that, in fact, are financially healthy.201  The loss
of credit can then trigger unpredictable failures of healthy firms, hastening a
financial crisis.202  Proactive resolution-based regulation could help to
reduce this source of interactive complexity by requiring systemically impor-
tant firms to disclose—at least periodically, if not also on demand—the
amount and identity of their securities holdings.203
The other source of interactive complexity is that market participants do
not know the contractual obligations of other firms.204  Yet if a firm defaults
on its obligations, its counterparties may be forced to default on their own
obligations.205  Again, therefore, risk-averse market participants may refuse
to extend credit to firms that appear similar to a defaulting firm but in fact
are financially healthy, thereby triggering unpredictable failures of those
healthy firms and hastening a financial crisis.206  The risk aversion might be
especially high if market participants fear a firm is contingently obligated on
derivatives contracts that expose it to indeterminate liability.207  Proactive
resolution-based regulation208 could help to reduce this source of interactive
complexity by requiring systemically important firms, as before,209 to disclose
the amount—or in the case of feared indeterminate liability, the estimated
limit210—and nature of their contractual obligations.211
Proactive resolution-based regulation could also help to reduce tight
coupling.212  Notably, central-bank last-resort lending could help to prevent
a disturbance to one part of the financial system—a default by a solvent but
201 Id. at 95–96.
202 Id. at 94 (discussing that interactive complexity causes that unpredictability).
203 I categorize this form of resolution-based regulation as proactive because it provides
for a preplanned enhancement (enhanced disclosure) that takes effect if the firm starts to
become troubled by potentially losing access to credit.  That disclosure then strengthens
the firm’s ability to pay its debt (and thereby avoid default) by providing continued access
to credit. See supra text accompanying notes 77–78 (defining proactive resolution-based
regulation).  Requiring disclosure might also be seen as counteractive.
204 Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 5, at 114.
205 Id. at 88.
206 See id. at 95–96.
207 Schwarcz, supra note 77, at 243–45.
208 This form of resolution-based regulation is proactive. See supra note 203 and accom-
panying text.
209 See supra notes 202–04 and accompanying text.
210 Parties to derivatives contracts usually can estimate the limits of their potential lia-
bility.  Steven L. Schwarcz, Central Clearing of Financial Contracts: Theory and Regulatory Impli-
cations, 167 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018–19), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3104079.
211 Cf. Schwarcz, supra note 77, at 243–47, 246 (discussing disclosure as an option to
help avoid a “crisis of confidence”).  Generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) do
not require sufficient disclosure of contractual obligations, especially contingent obliga-
tions, to reduce interactive complexity. Id. at 243.  GAAP requires parties to disclose con-
tingent liabilities only if the contingency is a “reasonable possibility,” which itself is a
subjective determination. Id. at 243–44 nn.181–83.
212 Id. at 247.
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illiquid systemically important firm—from spreading rapidly to other parts of
the system, including the defaulting firm’s counterparties.213  Such lending
would provide liquidity to the firm to prevent its default; and because the
firm is solvent, it should ultimately be able to repay the loan.214  I have sepa-
rately argued that the Dodd-Frank Act’s restrictions on the Federal Reserve’s
authority to make these types of loans should be rescinded.215
Next consider how resolution-based regulation could be designed to
protect systemically important markets and infrastructure.  Relatively little
regulation currently protects those critical elements of the financial
system.216
B. Resolution-Based Regulation of Systemically Important Markets
1. Reactive Resolution
A reactive approach to resolution-based regulation does not clearly
apply to troubled systemically important markets.  It is uncertain what it
would mean to reorganize a troubled financial market, and the conse-
quences of liquidating a financial market could be catastrophic.
2. Proactive Resolution
In contrast, proactive resolution-based regulation is ideally suited for
resolving systemically important markets that start to become troubled.  Con-
ceptually, there are at least two possible approaches: to preplan enhance-
ments that can make such a market become more internally robust,217 and to
commit parties in advance to provide liquidity to support such a market.218
Preplanning can make an unstable market more internally robust by
reducing its tight coupling.219  Financial markets today are tightly coupled in
at least two ways.  Computerized trading makes them especially susceptible to
so-called “flash crashes,” in which high-speed automated trading inadver-
tently can cause extremely rapid (and in retrospect, irrational) price
declines.220  Also, “mark-to-market” accounting, which requires that a securi-
ties account be adjusted in response to a change in the market value of the
213 See Steven L. Schwarcz, Essay, Controlling Financial Chaos: The Power and Limits of Law,
2012 WIS. L. REV. 815, 829.
214 See Schwarcz, supra note 77, at 250.
215 See Schwarcz, supra note 213, at 829–33.
216 See generally Peirce, supra note 12.
217 Steven L. Schwarcz, Perspectives on Regulating Systemic Risk, in SYSTEMIC RISK, INSTITU-
TIONAL DESIGN, AND THE REGULATION OF FINANCIAL MARKETS 39, 45 (Anita Anand ed.,
2016) (describing the question of how regulation should require systemically important
markets to become more internally robust as “important but only partly answered”).
218 Id.
219 Recall that tight coupling is the tendency of a failure in one part of a system to
quickly lead to other failures. See supra note 195.
220 See, e.g., Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 5, at 118 (explaining that “algorithmically
driven selling” of securities was a cause of the flash crash in 2010).
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securities (ordinarily reducing risk),221 can inadvertently cause fire sales222
that “distort value” during times of extreme market volatility.223
Regulatory preplanning can reduce the tight coupling of systemically
important financial markets.  For example, it can reduce the tight coupling
of a flash crash by requiring systemically important markets to have so-called
circuit breakers, which automatically suspend market trading if prices decline
too rapidly—e.g., by more than a preset amount in less than a preset time
span.224  Regulatory preplanning can also reduce the tight coupling of mark-
to-market accounting by suspending that accounting requirement in times of
extreme market volatility.225
That preplanning would require regulators to decide in advance—in
many cases, on a market-by-market basis—what price declines would be too
rapid,226 thereby justifying the suspension of trading, and what would consti-
tute extreme market volatility,227 thereby justifying the suspension of mark-
to-market accounting.  In making these decisions, regulators would have to
try to distinguish between short-term pricing fluctuations, potentially moti-
vated by panic, automated trades, or other shocks, and pricing fluctuations
that represent real changes in the value of the securities.  The process by
221 An investor, for example, may buy securities on credit from a securities broker-
dealer, securing the purchase price by pledging the securities as collateral.  To guard
against the price of the securities falling to the point where their value as collateral is
insufficient to repay the purchase price, the broker-dealer requires the investor to main-
tain a minimum collateral value.  If the market value of the securities falls below this mini-
mum, the broker-dealer will issue a “margin call” requiring the investor to deposit
additional collateral, usually in the form of money or additional securities, to satisfy this
minimum.  Failure to do so triggers a default, enabling the broker-dealer to foreclose on
the collateral. ZVI BODIE ET AL., INVESTMENTS 71–72 (8th ed. 2008).  Marking to market is
generally believed to reduce risk. See, e.g., Gikas A. Hardouvelis & Panayiotis Theodossiou,
The Asymmetric Relation Between Initial Margin Requirements and Stock Market Volatility Across
Bull and Bear Markets, 15 REV. FIN. STUD. 1525, 1554–55 (2002) (finding a correlation
between higher margin calls and decreased systemic risk).
222 For example, a temporary fall in the price of certain securities can force the sale of
those securities to generate cash; that forced sale in turn further drives down the price,
which in turn requires more forced sales—and this reiterative process rapidly continues,
resulting in a total collapse of the price of those securities.  Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra
note 5, at 118–19.
223 Id. at 119.
224 Cf. id. at 117 (“In the case of tight coupling . . . the focus would be on time—
slowing or suspending a buildup of consequences.”).  In response to a 2010 flash crash, the
SEC investigated ways to design such circuit breakers. Investor Bulletin: Measures to Address
Market Volatility, U.S. SEC. EXCHANGE & COMM’N. (July 1, 2012), https://www.sec.gov/oiea/
investor-alerts-bulletins/investor-alerts-circuitbreakersbulletinhtm.html (informing inves-
tors of possible circuit breakers for markets for equity securities).
225 Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 5, at 119.
226 See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
227 See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
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which regulators should make those decisions is beyond this Article’s
scope.228
Proactive resolution-based regulation can also strengthen and facilitate
the resolvability of unstable financial markets by committing parties in
advance to provide liquidity to stabilize market prices.  For example, the
internal regulations of some member-sponsored equity markets, such as the
New York Stock Exchange,229 impose liquidity requirements on their mem-
bers.230  Scholars are also examining the creation of partially privatized gov-
ernment liquidity facilities to support systemically important markets, by
“purchasing market securities at prices that are below their intrinsic values
but above their then-current prices”231 in order to “stabiliz[e] the prices of
distressed financial assets.”232
C. Resolution-Based Regulation of Systemically Important Infrastructure
1. Reactive Resolution
Because the systemically important infrastructure is, by definition, criti-
cal to the ongoing operation of the financial system,233 any reactive resolu-
tion would need to occur immediately to prevent troubled infrastructure
from failing.  Negotiated resolution, as occurs in a bankruptcy case,234 would
therefore likely be much too slow.  More quickly acting regulatory interven-
tions, perhaps similar to the OLA’s reactive resolution of systemically impor-
tant firms, could be more appropriate.  The OLA itself, however, is ill fitted
to resolving clearinghouses, which comprise a significant part of the systemi-
cally important infrastructure.235  Among other limitations, the FDIC, which
administers the OLA, “does not have experience regulating clearinghouses
or the derivatives markets.”236  Also, it is unclear whether the FDIC could
find a large healthy clearinghouse to acquire a troubled clearinghouse.  The
228 The SEC’s initial circuit-breaker designs “failed miserably,” for example, to prevent
an August 24, 2016, flash crash of exchange-traded funds.  Vance Harwood, ETF Flash
Crashes Happen with Big Funds Too, SIX FIGURE INVESTING (Dec. 6, 2016), https://
sixfigureinvesting.com/2015/08/secs-circuit-breakers-for-etf-etn-flash-crash/.
229 See N.Y. STOCK EXCH., DESIGNATED MARKET MAKERS (2016), https://www.nyse.com/
publicdocs/nyse/markets/nyse/designated_market_makers.pdf.
230 Schwarcz, supra note 217, at 45.
231 Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 5, at 108–09.
232 Id. at 107; cf. Gordon & Muller, supra note 116, at 185 (making similar arguments).
233 See supra notes 154–57 and accompanying text.
234 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
235 See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
236 David Skeel, What if a Clearinghouse Fails?, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (June 6, 2017),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/what-if-a-clearinghouse-fails/.  One scholar argues
that the prominent role of the FDIC and the absence of the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission in the OLA show that “Congress never intended OLA to apply to clearing-
houses regulated under Dodd-Frank.”  Stephen J. Lubben, Failure of the Clearinghouse: Dodd-
Frank’s Fatal Flaw?, 10 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 127, 151 (2015).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-2\NDL205.txt unknown Seq: 34 17-DEC-18 14:22
742 notre dame law review [vol. 94:2
limitations may be even worse for clearinghouses that constitute CCPs,237
which have balance sheets that are “quite different from those of other major
types of systemically important financial institutions such as banks, broker-
dealers, and insurance companies.”238
Professor Stephen Lubben has proposed an expedited regulatory inter-
vention to nationalize clearinghouses on the brink of failure, wiping out
“equity, memberships, and investor debt.”239 Previous clearinghouse mem-
bers could continue clearing through the nationalized clearinghouse on a
“fee for services basis.”240  Once the financial system stabilizes, the national-
ized clearinghouse would issue “new memberships . . . in exchange for new
contributions to the default fund and new capital commitments.”241  Nation-
alization, however, seems to be an overly draconian remedy that might even
be unconstitutional.242
2. Proactive Resolution
Proactive resolution, in contrast, should be especially appropriate for
infrastructure to ensure the uninterrupted and ongoing operation of the
financial system.243  Just as preplanned liquidity can enable systemically
important firms that start to become troubled to pay their debts244 and can
stabilize prices in turbulent financial markets,245 it can also be used to stabi-
lize troubled infrastructure—such as by enabling a financially unstable
clearinghouse to pay its expenses.  To this end, the Federal Reserve already
has the power to provide discount-window lending, a form of liquidity, to
clearinghouses and other FMUs “in unusual or exigent circumstances.”246
237 Cf. supra notes 162–64 and accompanying text (defining CCPs).
238 Duffie, supra note 155, at 88.
239 Stephen J. Lubben, Nationalize the Clearinghouses! 30, 31 (Seton Hall Pub. Law
Research Paper No. 2458506, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2458506 (arguing that a
federally chartered bridge institution should take over the troubled clearinghouse).
240 Id. at 31.
241 Id.
242 Cf. Duffie, supra note 155, at 104 (“An objective or requirement of some bankruptcy
and failure resolution processes is that no creditor should be allocated greater losses than
would have occurred in a counterfactual scenario in which the failing entity is simply liqui-
dated. . . . Resolution processes that cause some creditors to lose more than they would
have in a liquidation scenario, in order to reduce total social losses, would in this sense
involve some sort of violation of property rights.”).  This Article does not analyze whether
that nationalization might violate the Fifth Amendment.
243 See supra text accompanying note 233; cf. Peirce, supra note 168, at 647 (arguing
that the specter of CCP failure and the inability of firms to trade financial instruments
covered by Dodd-Frank’s clearing mandate gives clearing members and regulators a strong
interest in sustaining CCP services).
244 See supra notes 112–14 and accompanying text.
245 See supra text accompanying notes 229–32.
246 See 12 U.S.C. § 5465(b) (2012) (“The Board of Governors may authorize a Federal
Reserve bank . . . to provide to a designated financial market utility discount and borrow-
ing privileges only in unusual or exigent circumstances . . . .”); Peirce, supra note 168, at
648.
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FMUs that have been designated as systemically important FMUs247 are
already subject to proactive resolution-based regulation requiring them to
prepare both a recovery plan and a wind-down plan.248  International regula-
tors likewise want systemically important FMUs to plan how to try to recover,
if they start to become troubled, and how to wind down if they fail to
recover.249  These wind-down plans, and possibly also the recovery plans,
might be subject, however, to the same types of limitations that impact the
effectiveness of living wills: it is difficult to accurately predict how a firm will
fail, and planning to control the systemic contagion of a single firm’s winding
down does not prevent the systemic contagion caused by multiple firms wind-
ing down concurrently.250
Private organizations have proposed what is effectively proactive resolu-
tion-based solutions to help protect FMUs that are CCPs.  For example, the
International Swaps and Derivatives Association251 has proposed a contrac-
tual solution that it calls variation margin gains haircutting (VMGH)252 to
prevent a CCP from defaulting after its other financial resources have been
exhausted.253  At that time, the contract with its members would allow the
CCP to “conserve or accumulate cash by cancelling or reducing the variation
margin payments that it would otherwise have been required to make to
clearing members”254 while collecting all of the margin payments that its
members owe the CCP.255  Some argue, however, that the VMGH approach
could inadvertently amplify systemic risk.  For example, by imposing “addi-
tional losses on [CCP] members, and likely their customers” during what
would likely be a period of financial distress, it could cause some of those
firms to fail.256  Furthermore, by forcing customers “who expected cash pay-
ments . . . to liquidate assets in order to raise funds” to post their required
margin payments, it “would depress the value of these assets and weaken the
market, creating a pro-cyclical scenario that could further destabilize a col-
lapsing market.”257
247 See supra note 159 (discussing SIFMU designation).
248 Ryan, supra note 159.
249 Id. (discussing the Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures jointly issued in
2012 by the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures and the International
Organization of Securities Commissions).
250 See supra notes 61–64 and accompanying text.
251 Cf. supra note 66 (discussing ISDA).
252 See INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, INC., CCP LOSS ALLOCATION AT THE END OF
THE WATERFALL 4 (2013), https://www2.isda.org/attachment/NTc5Nw==/CCP_loss_alloca
tion_waterfall_0807.pdf.
253 Id. at 9.
254 Duffie, supra note 155, at 92.
255 See id.  Variation margin represents periodic (usually daily) payments or collateral
transfers that offset risk of loss due to daily changes in the market value of the CCP mem-
bers’ portfolios.  Peirce, supra note 168, at 607.
256 Lubben, supra note 236, at 153.
257 OFFICE OF REGULATORY AFFAIRS., JP MORGAN CHASE & CO., WHAT IS THE RESOLUTION
PLAN FOR CCPS? 2 (2014), https://www.jpmorganchase.com/corporate/About-JPMC/doc
ument/resolution-plan-ccps.pdf.
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As an alternative to VMGH, investment bank JP Morgan Chase has pro-
posed a form of privatized insurance that would be payable to help recapital-
ize an unstable CCP.258  Institutional investors could earn rents (in the form
of insurance premiums) by providing such insurance.259  This would also
incentivize the institutions providing the insurance to take on an outside
monitoring role.260
The European Union is implementing a very different proactive resolu-
tion-based regulatory approach to protecting CCP infrastructure.  Its Euro-
pean Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) requires “at least two CCPs
clearing a particular asset class for the clearing obligation to be imposed.”261
Therefore, if one CCP fails, another CCP should be available to perform the
clearing function.  EMIR is imperfect for several reasons, however.  It does
not solve the problem of correlated CCP failures.  It ignores the possibility
that a CCP’s failure might itself cause trading to freeze.262  Furthermore, it
does not actually require the creation of multiple CCPs; it merely suspends
the obligation that clearing occur through a CCP if only one CCP
remains.263
The above approaches address CCPs and some of the largest FMUs,264
but they largely neglect other FMUs that are part of a holding company struc-
ture that exposes them to affiliate financial and operating risks.265  Proactive
resolution-based regulation could be designed to protect those FMUs
through ring-fencing which, in relevant part, protects a firm from becoming
subject to liabilities and other risks associated with the bankruptcy [of affili-
ates]; . . . help[s] ensure that a firm is able to operate on a standalone basis
even if its affiliated firms fail; . . . [and] protect[s] a firm from being taken
advantage of by affiliated firms, thereby preserving the firm’s business and
assets.266
Because it is costly, ring-fencing is most commonly used to protect monopoly
or semimonopoly entities (which thus have few, if any, substitutes) that pro-
vide essential public services, such as public utilities that produce and dissem-
258 See id. at 4.
259 Duffie, supra note 155, at 99.
260 Peirce, supra note 168, at 655.  That alternative is similar to the partly privatized
liquidity facilities discussed above. See supra notes 231–32 and accompanying text.
261 WORLD FED’N EXCHS., THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN CENTRAL COUNTERPARTY (CCP)
RECOVERY AND RESOLUTION: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 5 (2017).
262 Cf. id. at 7 (“Given the significant effect of [a CCP failure], if it were to occur it is
quite possible also that the market itself would no longer be viable because of the likely
drain on liquidity from those players exiting . . . .”).
263 See EUROPEAN BANKING FED’N, EBF RESPONSE TO ESMA CONSULTATION PAPER ON THE
CLEARING OBLIGATION UNDER EMIR (NO. 1) (2014), http://www.ebf-fbe.eu/wp-content/
uploads/2014/08/EBF_009858G-FINAL-EBF-response-to-ESMA-CP-on-clearing-obligation-
no.1-IRS.pdf.
264 Cf. supra note 159 (discussing SIFMUs).
265 See supra notes 165–67 and accompanying text (discussing FMU exposure to affiliate
risks).
266 See Steven L. Schwarcz, Ring-Fencing, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 69, 81–82 (2013).
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inate electric energy.267  This is especially valuable where the utility is part of
a holding company structure that exposes it to nonutility risk; insulation of
the utility from that risk helps to assure unimpaired continuation of the pub-
lic services.268
FMUs fit that pattern if they are in a holding company structure that
exposes them to other risks.  Like public utilities, FMUs provide essential
public services (by ensuring the ongoing operation of the financial system).
Also like public utilities, FMUs have few, if any, substitutes; indeed, they are
often the only entity able to perform clearing and settlement services.269
For example, ICE Clear Credit, an FMU that provides central
counterparty clearing services for credit-default swap derivatives, is an indi-
rect subsidiary of Intercontinental Exchange.270  Intercontinental Exchange
engages in an aggressive acquisition strategy271 that has caused it to incur
significant debt,272 and “[m]any aspects of [its] business . . . involve substan-
tial risks of liability.”273  Ring-fencing ICE Clear Credit would help to protect
it from its parent company’s financial and operating risks,274 thereby assur-
ing the continuing performance of the FMU’s clearing services even if the
parent fails.275
267 Id. at 105.
268 Id. at 74.
269 See, e.g., FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, supra note 159, at 157, 160–61, 174.
270 Id. at 172.
271 See INTERCONTINENTAL EXCH., ILLUMINATING MARKETS: 2016 ANNUAL REPORT 29
(2016), http://ir.theice.com/~/media/Files/I/Ice-IR/annual-reports/2016/2016-annual-
report.pdf (“We may be very acquisitive.”).
272 See id. at 31 (“Following our acquisition of NYSE and Interactive Data, we have a
significant amount of indebtedness outstanding on a consolidated basis.”).
273 See id. at 33 (“Many aspects of our business . . . involve substantial risks of liabil-
ity. . . . For example, dissatisfied market participants that have traded on our electronic
platform . . . may make claims regarding the quality of trade execution, or allege improp-
erly confirmed or settled trades, abusive trading practices, security and confidentiality
breaches, mismanagement or even fraud against us or our participants. . . . An adverse
resolution of any lawsuit or claim against us may require us to pay substantial
damages . . . .”).
274 The actual mechanics of ring-fencing an FMU are beyond this Article’s scope
because they would be highly fact dependent.  In general, though, they would likely
include preplanning protections that make the FMU bankruptcy remote from its affiliates
and able to operate on a standalone basis if the affiliates fail. Cf. Schwarcz, supra note 266,
at 74 (explaining how ring-fencing can help to protect the continuing functioning of a
utility within a holding company structure).
275 Ring-fencing might also be considered for the most critically systemically important
FMUs, even if their affiliate risk is small.  For example, CME Clearing, an FMU that clears
the vast majority of the market for U.S. futures, options on futures, and commodity
options, is an unincorporated division of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. FIN. STABILITY
OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, supra note 159, at 157.  Ring-fencing CME Clearing could help to
insulate it from the exchange-related risks, thereby assuring unimpaired continuation of its
clearing services in the unlikely event that the exchange fails.
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CONCLUSION
In response to the global financial crisis, regulators and policymakers
have been shifting their focus from microprudential regulation, which is
intended to protect individual firms, to macroprudential regulation, which
protects the stability of the financial system itself.  Frustrated that they have
made little progress in figuring out how to prevent another crisis, regulators
are now trying to apply bankruptcy “resolution” techniques to help stabilize
the financial system.  To date, however, their efforts have been insufficient, in
part because bankruptcy law traditionally has microprudential goals whereas
protecting financial stability is a macroprudential goal.
This Article seeks to derive a logical and consistent theory of how and
why resolution-based regulation can help to stabilize the financial system.  To
that end, the Article identifies three possible regulatory approaches: reactive
resolution-based regulation, which comprises variations on traditional bank-
ruptcy; proactive resolution-based regulation, which consists of preplanned
enhancements that are designed to strengthen or facilitate the resolvability
of financial-system elements that start to become troubled; and counteractive
regulation, which seeks to reduce the need for resolution (and thus is not
truly resolution).276
The Article then argues that resolution-based regulation should seek not
merely (as currently conceived) to protect individual troubled systemically
important firms but also to protect against the failure of systemically impor-
tant firms collectively, as well as to protect other critical elements of the
financial system.  These include the markets in which securities and other
financial assets are traded and the infrastructure that serves to facilitate that
trading.  Finally, the Article applies these insights to design resolution-based
regulation that can be used by regulators as an additional macroprudential
“tool.”277
This Article’s analysis of macroprudential resolution-based regulation
should be applicable both domestically and abroad.  The Article does not
examine, however, the cross-border recognition or possible international
integration of inconsistent resolution-based regulatory approaches.  The Leh-
man Brothers bankruptcy illustrated that the efficient cross-border resolution
of a multinational systemically important firm requires significant interna-
tional coordination, making that an important subject for further study.278
276 Cf. supra note 121 (discussing an intuitive way to distinguish these regulatory
approaches).
277 Cf. supra note 4 (discussing the so-called macroprudential regulatory toolkit).
278 The author has separately examined cross-border recognition of resolution
approaches. See Steven L. Schwarcz et al., Comments on the September 29, 2014 FSB Consulta-
tive Document, “Cross-Border Recognition of Resolution Action” (Ctr. for Int’l Governance Inno-
vation, CIGI Paper No. 51, 2014), http://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/
no.51.pdf.  A group of U.S. and international bankruptcy and financial regulation scholars,
including the author, has also been analyzing the cross-border integration of resolution
approaches. See Financial Scholars Letter, supra note 50, at 3.  Among other things, that
letter argues that courts are likely to “lack deep prior relationships or the authority to
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reach understandings with foreign regulators in advance of a bankruptcy filing,” thereby
“increas[ing] the likelihood that foreign regulators or foreign courts, at the behest of local
interests, will seize assets [of the global systemically important firm] within their jurisdic-
tion.” Id.  Just as that type of grab race is thought to undermine the effectiveness of a
domestic firm’s resolution, it is “likely to be the death-knell of a successful” resolution of a
global systemically important firm. Id.
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APPENDIX
A. Regulatory Design Recommendations
Referencing the Article’s detailed discussion, this Appendix briefly sum-
marizes how to design “macroprudential” resolution-based regulation to pro-
tect not only systemically important firms but also systemically important
financial markets and infrastructure.  The summary also distinguishes which
forms of resolution-based regulation are reactive279 and which are
proactive.280
1. Resolution-Based Regulation of Systemically Important Firms
Reactive resolution-based regulation should not be limited, as under
existing law, to protecting systemically important firms that individually
become troubled.  The financial crisis showed that multiple systemically
important firms can become troubled around the same time,281 requiring a
more aggregate and coordinated response than is feasible in judicial bank-
ruptcy cases.282  Regulator-supervised resolution could help to provide that
response, but regulators would likely have less resolution expertise than
bankruptcy judges.  To remedy that, bankruptcy judges could be assigned as
supervisors of the regulatory procedures.283
DIP financing will be necessary to enable multiple troubled systemically
important firms to continue operating for the length of time needed to reor-
ganize their capital structure.  If private sources are inadequate, the govern-
ment should consider providing this financing.284
Proactive resolution-based regulation could help to reduce the interac-
tive complexity and tight coupling that can cause unpredictable counterparty
behavior.  To that end, regulation could require systemically important firms
to disclose to their counterparties—at least periodically, if not also on
demand—the amount and identity of their securities holdings285 as well as
the amount (or in the case of feared indeterminate liability on derivatives
contracts, the estimated limit) and nature of their contractual obligations.286
To prevent systemically important firms from defaulting and rapidly spread-
ing financial panic, central banks could consider providing, and at least
should be authorized to provide, last-resort lending to such firms—especially
279 Resolution-based regulation is reactive if it applies to financial system elements—
i.e., firms, markets, or infrastructure—that become troubled.
280 Resolution-based regulation is proactive if it consists of preplanned enhancements
that are designed to strengthen or facilitate the resolvability of financial system elements
that start to become troubled.
281 See supra notes 63–64 and accompanying text.
282 See supra text accompanying notes 179–80.
283 See supra text accompanying notes 181–82.
284 See supra text accompanying notes 186–91.
285 See supra text accompanying notes 202–03.
286 See supra text accompanying notes 204–11. R
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to those that are illiquid but solvent, and thus ultimately able to repay the
loan.287
2. Resolution-Based Regulation of Systemically Important
Financial Markets
The existing focus of resolution-based regulation on troubled systemi-
cally important firms obscures the importance of also using resolution-based
regulation to protect other critical elements of the financial system whose
failure could trigger a systemic collapse.  These include the markets that
trade securities and other financial assets.
Proactive resolution-based regulation is ideally suited for resolving sys-
temically important markets that start to become troubled.  To prevent the
collapse of unstable markets, such regulation could require circuit breakers
to automatically suspend trading if prices decline too rapidly.288  Similarly,
regulation could suspend mark-to-market accounting in systemically impor-
tant markets that become subject to extreme volatility.289
Proactive resolution-based regulation could also require the creation of
liquidity facilities to help stabilize prices in a market panic.  Such facilities
could be used, for example, to purchase “securities at prices that are below
their intrinsic values but above their then-current prices,” thereby stabilizing
prices at more reasonable levels.290  Although these liquidity facilities could
be governmental, they might be partly privatized.291
3. Resolution-Based Regulation of Systemically Important
Financial Infrastructure
The financial infrastructure that serves to clear and settle the trading of
securities and other financial assets constitutes another critical element of
the financial system whose failure could trigger a systemic collapse.  Govern-
ments and private organizations have been considering, at least implicitly,
how proactive resolution-based regulation could protect parts of this infra-
structure.  However, they have largely ignored the need to protect financial
infrastructure from undue exposure to affiliate risks.  Resolution-based regu-
lation could provide that protection proactively by ring-fencing the infra-
structure and making it bankruptcy remote.292
287 See supra text accompanying notes 213–14.
288 See supra text accompanying notes 224–25.
289 See supra text accompanying notes 224–25.
290 Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 5, at 109; see supra text accompanying notes
229–32.
291 See supra text accompanying notes 229–32.
292 See supra text accompanying notes 264–75.
